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Summary 
Beginning with Plato's expulsion of the poets in the Republic, this dissertation 
looks at the often hostile, yet also symbiotic, relationship between poetry and 
philosophy. Aristotle's 'response' to Plato is regarded as a significant origin of 
literary theory. Nietzsche's critique of Western philosophy as being an attempt to 
suppress its own metaphoricity, leads to a revaluation of truth and consequently 
of the privileging of philosophy over poetry. Post-structuralism sometimes 
overemphasizes this constitutive force of metaphoricity, at the expense of 
conceptual modes. However, Derrida's notion of philosophy as play retains a 
balance between concept and metaphor: there is no attempt to transcendentally 
ground philosophy, but neither is it reduced to a merely metaphorical discourse. 
Finally, Wittgenstein's notion of meaning as determined by use can help us 
distinguish pragmatically between poetry and philosophy by looking at the 
contexts in which they function. 
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PlATO'S ANCIENT QUARREL 
Though poetry and philosophy have profoundly shaped Western intellectual 
culture, they have remained elusively difficult to define. In fact, their reciprocal 
hostility has often seemed the only factor we can take for granted. There is good 
reason to suppose that this hostility has been exacerbated because, in their 
disparagement of each other, the poet and the philosopher have seen the surest 
means to self-definition. What would philosophy be without a self-conscious 
sense of the 'non-philosophical'? Where would the 'passion' and 'rich · 
particularity' of poetry be without philosophy's abstractions? Of course there have 
been, and still are, poets who think like philosophers, and philosophers who write 
like poets, but their achievements along the borders have not eliminated these 
borders on an institutional level. And yet, any close study reveals that philosophy 
is permeated by poetic elements, and that poetry cannot be divorced from its 
claims to truth. The primary aim of a comparative study such as this must be to 
do justice to the complexity of the historical and analytical issues involved, and 
so perhaps present a map of possibilities for further investigation. 
In the work of Plato, Western philosophy comes increasingly to understand itself 
as the attempt to supplant or re-articulate uses of language which depend on 
persuasion rather than dialectic for their effect. Such uses of language would pre-
eminently include rhetoric, the very art of persuasion, but in Plato it is at times 
conceived broadly enough to include poetry 1, which also speaks without securing 
access to what is worth knowing. Of course, from the outset there is a curious 
ambivalence in the philosophical attitude. Paul Ricouer, in The Rule of Metaphor, 
points out that rhetoric is philosophy's enemy because 'it is always possible for 
1 I use the term 'poetry' fairly loosely. The Greeks did not have a term for 'literature', as we understand it, 
and Aristotle's Poetics, which I will make use of, is primarily concerned with Tragedy. There is clearly 
some terminological vagueness at the origin of these issues. I will use the term 'literature' to refer to a 
3 
the art of "saying it well" to lay aside all concern for "speaking the truth"' (Ricouer 
1986: 10). And yet philosophy, like rhetoric, is a discursive practice. That is to 
say, it too must convince if it is to succeed. The Platonic distrust of poetry views 
it, at best, as an incomplete, juvenile form of knowledge, and at worst as a 
serious threat to the kind of rationality which could legitimate utopian schemes or 
the perfection of the self. Closely allied to this explicitly distrustful tradition is the 
philosophical tendency to condescend to poetry. In his essay 'The Philosophical 
Disenfranchisement of Art', Arthur Danto argues that post-Platonic philosophy 
has in fact been characterized by either 'the analytical effort to ephemeralize and 
hence defuse art, or, to allow a degree of validity to art by treating it as doing 
what philosophy itself does, only uncouthly' (Danto 1986: 7). 
This quarrel with the poetic arguably inaugurates Western philosophy as a 
discipline with claims to autonomy. Both Dalia Judovitz, in her essay 'Philosophy 
and Poetry: The Difference between them in Plato and Descartes', and Arthur 
Danto argue that the origin of philosophy is the banishment of poetry. According 
to Judovitz 'this conflict.. .can be shown to function as the constitutive operation in 
the foundation of philosophy as a metaphysical discourse' (Judovitz in Cascardi 
(ed.) 1987: 27). Plato's quarrel with poetry, described by him in the Republic as 
being already an 'ancient quarrel' 2 , revolves around the question of what kind of 
knowledge poets may be said to possess, as well as the propriety of this 
knowledge. In denying the validity of the poetic mode, which is one form of the 
art of representation, of mimesis, in other words, Plato is necessarily forced to 
develop his particular conception of knowledge. As Danto puts it: 'philosophy 
itself may just be the disenfranchisement of art' (Danto 1986: 7). 
In the attempt to clarify the Platonic antagonism towards poetry, it is tempting to 
treat Plato's remarks on the subject as a sustained, well-developed argument. 
This can, however, be misleading. Neither Danto nor Judovitz necessarily do 
collection of texts, assumptions and commentaries within a complexly organized, predominantly secular 
culture, and 'poetry' as a more generic term for an articulated, usually text-based, representational art. 
2 This may, of course, be a rhetorical flourish to some extent. 
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justice to the complexity and downright contradictoriness of Plato's position(s), 
preferring to simplify matters for polemical purposes by drawing only on the Ion 
and on sections of the Republic. Gerald Else, in his Plato and Aristotle on Poetry, 
points out that 'Plato's statements on the subject do not form a coherent logical 
whole, much less a complete theory of poetry' (Else 1986: 5). Concerning the 
famous 'expulsion' of the poets in Book Ill, for example, it is not entirely clear 
whether Plato means to banish all poets without distinction, or merely the less 
'dignified' sort, those who 'will be all the readier to widen their range the worse 
they are, and will think nothing beneath them' (Plato 1974: 155). The actual 
banishment passage is clear enough: 'So if we are visited in our state by 
someone who has skill to transform himself into all sorts of characters and 
represent all sorts of things, and he wants to show off himself and his poems to 
us, we shall treat him with all the reverence due to a priest and a giver of rare 
pleasure, but shall tell him that he and his kind have no place in our city' (Plato 
1974: 157). Nevertheless, we can't be sure that Plato would unequivocally 
classify Homer, for example, with the 'pantomimic gentlemen'. And the whole 
matter is further complicated by what follows, where Socrates says: 'For 
ourselves, we shall for our own good employ story-tellers and poets who are 
severe rather than amusing, who portray the style of the good man and in their 
works abide by the principles we laid down for them when we started out on this 
attempt to educate our military class' (Plato 197 4: 157). This does seem to imply 
the sanction of a certain kind of poetry, albeit a more narrowly conceived, 
pedagogic one, which is simple in form and has as its subject the praise of the 
gods. What we might call edifying works, in other words. In Aristotle on Tragic 
and Comic Mimesis, Leon Golden makes a useful distinction when he argues 
that Plato 'held in delicate balance a philosophical contempt for mimesis3 - due to 
its essential alienation from ultimate reality - and a sober realization that the 
3 Mimesis can mean simply representation or imitation (cf. Book III of The Republic where Plato cites the 
representation, in sound and gesture, of everything from the noises of thunder and wind and hail to the 
twittering of birds (Plato 1974; 155, 156)), but also carries the more Aristotelian sense of the representation 
of the particular with the aim ofleading us to general insights, especially about the moral aspects of human 
nature. 
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skilled use of mimesis is an indispensable means for whatever approach we are 
able to make to that ultimate reality' (Golden 1992: 41 ). 
More significant, though, than the precise nuances of Plato's thought is the fact 
that he sets a precedent with far-reaching historical consequences, in trying to 
secure for theory the authority to determine the nature of art, and to limit its 
scope. There is certainly no love for unregulated poetic freedom in Plato: it is 
associated with undisciplined desire, with the nascent tendency of democracy to 
become a 'rule of the mob' and so to deteriorate into tyranny. Only if poetry 
allows itself to be circumscribed by philosophy, can it still, in principle, retain a 
didactic function within the republic. In his essay 'Literature and Philosophy: 
Sense or Nonsense', Morris Weitz emphasizes that: 'Whatever the nuances, 
subtleties, or deviations may be in Plato's writings (some commentators even 
regard him as the supreme poet or maker), Plato never wavers on his 
fundamental and irreducible dichotomy between literature and philosophy' 
(Strelka (ed.) 1983: 4). 
In the Platonic scheme, there are essentially two problems with the mimetic or 
representational arts, namely their 'ontological separation from true reality' 
(Golden 1992: 41) and their 'potential for subverting the character of both the 
individual and the state' (Golden 1992: 41 ). Regarding the first, for Plato poetry, 
as a representational art, can never be more than acquaintance with a particular 
thing. It does not function through that mode of abstraction which, in the Platonic 
conception, allows us access to universals. Lacking this knowledge, it becomes 
an imitation of no more than the appearing world, which, for Plato, is already 
removed from the real. Poetry is an imitation of an imitation. If poetry's 
knowledge is knowledge only of appearances, of the sensible world, then, in 
terms of the Platonic dualism between essence and appearance, poetry can 
never know and never speak of that which is truly important, the intelligible world. 
This is not to say that the poet does not possess power over the soul. The poet is 
a threat to the rational utopia depicted in the Republic precisely because 'The 
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poet's only true craft is the exploitation of a confusion in the soul about essence 
and appearance' (Judovitz in Cascardi (ed.) 1987: 37). Another name for the 
exploitation of confusion in the soul for the purpose of winning arguments is, of 
course, rhetoric, for Plato the arch-enemy of philosophy. It is the fact that poets 
are said to exploit this confusion in the soul that gives the Republic's anti-poetry 
stance its political overtones. Poetry as engenderer of confusion is clearly a 
threat to the kind of utopia established and maintained through the self-present 
rationality of free citizens. 
Plato introduces the dialectic as the pre-eminent model of all true knowledge. His 
Dialogues are a representation of the attainment of knowledge of the real and the 
good through an idealized conversational process where questioning weeds out 
merely sophistic beliefs. The ideal situation is based on reciprocity: a mutually 
transformative process through engagement with the matter at hand. For Plato 
the dialectic is in fact a living communion between one soul and another. A 
further problem with poetry (and its spokespeople, the poets) is that it 
(supposedly) cannot participate in this manner. The poets are depicted as 
unreflexive: they are unable to offer reliable commentary on what it is they are 
doing. The rhapsode whom Socrates interrogates in Ion, for example, is unable 
to move from passionate recitation to analysis of what he is reciting, and thus 
cannot be said to possess knowledge. The fact that poetry does not seem to be 
circumscribed by any epistemic constraints that would objectify its domain and 
delimit its methodology leads Socrates to conclude that 'neither the 
rhapsode ... nor the poet...can be ascertained as possessing an art4' (Judovitz in 
Cascardi (ed.) 1987:31). Saying the same thing again and again, a poem merely 
simulates conversation: there is no exchange; the dialectic, as the eventual 
securing of knowledge, cannot get under way: 'Poetry must be expelled because 
it pretends to speak' (Judovitz in Cascardi (ed.) 1987: 38). 
4 The use of the word 'art' here would seem to confuse matters, but what Socrates presumably means is 
either self-conscious skill (techne) or a general discipline. Ion evidently lacks both. 
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However, such an argument seems to miss the point that poetry is situated in an 
ever-changing context of other poems and varying readings which form a 
significant cultural ensemble. In other words, poetry is a part of 'literature'. The 
Greeks had no word for literature as we understand it, and this fact does 
condition Plato's view. For the individual poet as uncritical vessel of inspiration 
we, at any rate, can easily substitute the notion of the 'interpretive community' 
which, through criticism and commentary, secures the possibility of meaningful 
dialogue. The fact that a particular poet may not be able to take up a critical 
position regarding his work does not exclude poetry in general from the critical 
orientation: 'Plato's narrow interpretation of dialogue in terms of conversation 
fails to account for the ongoing polyphonic dialogue in which poetry is already 
engaged' (Judovitz in Cascardi (ed.) 1987: 39). 
In his Literature against Philosophy, Plato to Derrida, Edmundson emphasizes 
that this attack on poetry and the poet is accompanied by a conception of what 
the philosopher ought to be. In fact: 'The two groups define each other 
reciprocally' (Edmundson 1995: 6). In terms of this account, the poet and the true 
philosopher are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Poets are often hysterical and 
whimsical; though they can be fascinating, they rarely leave useful teachings 
behind. True philosophers, by contrast, are a restrained, stoic elite who gather 
loving adherents to the truth of their doctrines. According to Edmundson, Plato is 
uneasy about the poet in his own soul: he is, after all, remembered as much for 
his analogies, images and myth-making, for his poetry, as for his abstract 
arguments. The obvious paradox, that one of the most poetic of all philosophers 
is so opposed, at least in The Republic, to the institutionalization of poetry, is 
made clearer if we remember that Plato wrote poetry in his youth, and burnt it 
after his encounter with Socrates. In his Dialogue and Dialectic, Gadamer makes 
the point that it is not that Plato can't become a great poet, but that he no longer 
wants to. As the disciple of Socrates, as the lover of sophia, Plato believes he 
must cease to engage with art as art, with poetry as poetry. He must now engage 
with them as the philosopher. The rejection of mimesis is not necessarily total, 
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but there can be no doubt that it is subordinated to dialectic as a mode for 
securing knowledge. 5 
Though it is an over-simplification to assert that Plato rejects poetry out of hand, 
he rarely does justice to it when discussing it theoretically. In the /on, Plato's 
superficial explication of inspiration as a sort of 'divine possession' removes all 
critical functions from the poet, who becomes a mere vessel: 'The poet is 
presented as a creature whose inspiration and method preclude reason and 
therefore a true knowledge of things' (Judovitz in Cascardi (ed.) 1987: 31). To 
achieve this, it is firstly necessary for Plato to select an outstandingly dim-witted 
example of the poetic type in Ion, enthusiastic reciter of Homer, who is unable to 
answer any critical or evaluative questions about what he recites. Plato here 
wants to show that poetry is solely a matter of inspiration, that 'the poet is not 
able to compose until he has become inspired and out of his mind and his reason 
is no longer in him' (Else 1986: 7). In other words, 'reason must depart before 
poetizing can begin' (Else 1986: 7). That this is a strategic move is obvious. Else, 
using Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar as examples, points out that the 'tradition as a 
whole is far from sanctioning Plato's dichotomy between inspiration and reason' 
(Else 1986: 8). One is an artist and one is inspired. But Plato must build 
inspiration up 'to an impossible height of absurdity' (Else 1986: 8) because his 
argument is that poetry is irrational and lacks self-reflexivity. The strategy is well-
expressed by Judovitz: 'By reducing poetry to an oracular genre, one in which 
the divinely inspired poet is deprived of his own voice, Plato frees philosophy 
from the challenge of truly considering the problem of knowledge posed by 
poetry' (Judovitz in Cascardi (ed.) 1987: 32). 
5 Mimesis retains a function as a form of illustration, for example in myth and analogy, which can be 'an 
imaginative provocation to serious reasoning that, when successful, can open a path for transcending 




POETRY AND KNOWLEDGE 
! 
A hard-line Platonic stance (whether truly attributable to Plato or not) sees Plato 
as introducing, in Morris Weitz's words, 'the powerful idea that literature is purely 
emotive' (Strelka (ed.) 1983: 5). This conception of the poetic, as being nothing 
but emotion, severs it from reliable claims to truth, and sets up the historically 
powerful dichotomy between poetry and philosophy: 'one of the footnotes Plato 
bequeaths to western thought and literary criticism is that literature can no more 
be married to philosophy than falsehood can to truth' (Strelka 1983: 5). When, 
however, we seriously entertain an alternative possibility, we are already closer 
to Aristotle's 'response' to Plato, and his conception of poetry as 'a repository of 
truths about the general or shared features of human actions and experiences' 
(Strelka 1983: 6). We are then assuming that poetry does have access to truth, 
though in a way which differs from that of philosophy. The Aristotelian revaluation 
is crucial because it has, in many ways, determined the kinds of defences of 
poetry considered appropriate. This chapter begins by looking in some detail at 
the Poetics, and then proceeds to a discussion of some possibilities it implies. 
Though the Poetics is primarily concerned with the elements of tragedy, it is, I 
believe, legitimate to employ it in a discussion of poetry for two related reasons. 
Firstly, both tragedy and comedy are, according to Aristotle, developments of a 
more general, pre-existing 'poetry': 'Poetry ... soon branched out into two kinds 
according to the differences of character in the individual poets ... as soon as 
Tragedy and Comedy came upon the scene, those who had a natural tendency 
to one style of poetry became writers of comedies ... and those with a natural bent 
for the other style became writers of tragedies' (Aristotle 1963: 9). We can 
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therefore assume that at least some of the conclusions concerning tragedy will 
be relevant to the less differentiated 'poetry'. Secondly, Aristotle considers 
tragedy, like poetry, to be a form of mimesis, in other words an art which 
represents by imitation. Clearly, general conclusions concerning mimesis will be 
as applicable to poetry as to tragedy. 
We saw in the introduction that Plato subordinated mimesis to the dialectic, 
poetry to philosophy. Early in the Poetics, Aristotle presents a discussion of 
mimesis which emphasizes Its importance and thus, it would seem, at least 
tangentially contests Plato's scheme. According to Aristotle, one of the things 
that makes humanity superior to the animals is the fact that we are imitative 
animals. A person 'begins to learn by way of imitation; and it is moreover natural 
for all human beings to delight in works of imitation' (Aristotle 1963: 8). For 
Aristotle, there is no doubt that mimesis engages with our emotions in a 
meaningful, serious way which can have a pedagogic value. He does not, 
however, make it explicitly clear what he means by imitation. A medical treatise,. 
for example, even if written in verse, would not qualify, whereas a Socratic 
dialogue would. In fact, Aristotle indicates his awareness that a term needs to be 
introduced here: 'There is further an art which imitates by language alone, 
without harmony, in prose or in verse, and if the latter, either in some one or in a 
plurality of meters. This form of imitation is to this day without a name' (Aristotle 
1963: 4). The gap Aristotle identifies has subsequently been filled with the term 
'literature'. If we then ask what these works are intended to represent, Aristotle 
gives a clear enough answer: 'The objects represented by an imitator are actions 
performed by men who are necessarily either good or bad' (Aristotle 1963: 5). In 
Aristotle on the Purposes of Literature, Norman Gulley provides the following 
elaboration: 'Aristotle's point is that the aspects of human behaviour which are 
fundamental for the artist's purposes are those which are capable of engaging 
our moral sympathy or antipathy in any way' (Gulley 1971: 7). 
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Aristotle famously assigns the representational arts a higher place than history. 
This valuation rests on his distinction between what happens and what could 
happen, between the factual and the probable. In Gulley's words: 'The guideline 
for the artist...is not what is, but what can be. And according to the genre he is 
working in he has to judge what can plausibly be represented, that is, he must 
avoid anything improbable or irrational which is likely to thwart his aim of 
engaging his readers' sympathies' (Gulley 1971: 11 ). History is merely 
descriptive and as such cannot be more than an account of particulars. But 
poetry 'is more philosophic and of greater significance than history, for its 
statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are 
particulars' (Aristotle 1963: 17). In the next sentence Aristotle explicitly links 
probability and universality: 'A universal statement declares what such or such a 
kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do; and that is the aim of poetry' 
(Aristotle 1963: 17). 
Without doubt Aristotle is far more appreciative of the function of representational 
art than Plato, to the extent of considering it 'philosophical' in some sense. 
However, we should not assume that the universalizing potential of 
representational art makes such art true in the sense in which a philosophical 
statement can be said to be true. Within the parameters of the probable, it is the 
ability of works to evoke universal emotions which constitutes their validity and 
potency. Gulley expresses it clearly: 'When Aristotle gives his fine analysis of 
what is the best tragedy he is giving an analysis of the best means of achieving 
. certain emotional effects ... the artist's aim is not simply to arouse them but also to 
regulate them' (Gulley 1971: 18). It would seem as though psychological 
considerations do feature in Aristotle's account of the value of tragedy and 
representational art generally. 
The aim of tragedy, as a form of mimesis, is katharsis. Aristotle introduces the 
term without defining it, and it remains a contentious one. A number of critics 
have recently cast doubt on the influential identification of katharsis with moral 
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purification or with purgation in a quasi-medical sense6 . Since the problem is one 
of interpretation, any English translation will already reflect a bias towards a 
particular point of view. The Everyman edition, for example, translates as 
follows: 'A tragedy is the imitation of an action ... with incidents arousing pity and 
fear, whereby to provide an outlet for such emotions' (Aristotle 1963: 12). The 
debate concerning the possible range of meanings of katharsis is significant for 
us, because the kind of meaning assigned to it will determine the kind of value 
assigned to representational art. At the beginning of this chapter we cited the 
Platonic view that art is purely a matter of emotion. The purgation view of 
katharsis implicitly supports this because it seems to see Tragedy's primary 
function as an emotional I psychological one, rather than an intellectual I 
cognitive one. Golden, by contrast, in Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis, 
argues that we should understand katharsis as the more cognitive pleasure of 
learning, of 'intellectual clarification' (Golden 1992: 26), an account of which 
Aristotle provides when he discusses mimesis. The claim that poetry is a mode of 
securing knowledge becomes more tenable in a context where imitation as a 
form of learning supercedes imitation as an outlet for the emotions. The tendency 
to see in representational art little more than a tool for the vicarious experience of 
various emotions has a long history and has conditioned the reading of Aristotle. 
Clearly it plays straight into the hands of what appears to be an oversimplified 
dichotomy between 'rational' philosophy and 'emotive' poetry. 
6 For example Leon Golden in his Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis. 
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!! 
Because Aristotle is an originator of the disciplines we now call literary criticism 
and literary theory, it is important to ask what his discussion of representational 
art in the Poetics bequeaths to subsequent thinkers. We have looked at his 
deployment of the crucial terms mimesis and katharsis, and I would now like to 
move away from specific Aristotelian arguments and instead investigate what 
might be called the underlying conceptual and stylistic assumptions which govern 
his approach. These have probably been as influential as the actual concepts he 
introduces or refines. 
In Aristotle the representational work of art becomes 'philosophical': it becomes 
something made according to principles of construction, and as such can 
profitably be studied, as opposed to merely experienced. The introduction of 
formal analysis becomes the mode through which we can be said to gain 
knowledge of a work. In other words, the process whereby poetry becomes 
intellectually respectable in Aristotle is precisely the intel/ectualization of poetry, 
which implies its demystification too. For Plato the poem is still potentially a 
powerfully disruptive form of communication; as such it must be philosophy's 
rival. Aristotle's poets, however, are craftsmen rather than inspired vessels, and 
where poetic requirements are laid down these tend to be formal. Aristotle does 
not seem to share Plato's sense of poetry as a quasi-primordial force. Else writes 
that, unlike Plato's, 'Aristotle's soul was not haunted by poetry' (Else 1986: 203). 
Edmundson claims that the Aristotelian revaluation is a mixed blessing: 'Aristotle, 
according to many, starts out trying to defend poetry against Plato, but he ends 
up engendering modes of formalism that undermine poetry's influence in more 
sophisticated ways than Plato ever conceived' (Edmundson 1995: 9, 10). 
According to this argument, the Aristotelian revaluation of art, with its emphasis 
on the study of 'form' rather than 'content', has lent authority to interpretive 
tendencies which avoid the powerful potential of art to transform those who 
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experience it. The application of concepts to poetic texts, so the argument goes, 
also tends to diminish respect for the particularity of works. Since concepts by 
their nature tend to have a totalizing function, similarity can come to be valued 
over difference: 'Using formal categories ... on a number of works tends to elide 
the ways they differ from each other. ... Summary terms interfere with our ability 
to perceive what is unique, and uniquely valuable in a given work' (Edmundson 
1995: 9). 
The fear which Edmundson articulates, shared by Rapp in his essay 'Philosophy 
and Poetry: The New Rapprochement', is that the autonomy of poetry, and 
consequently its value, is diminished when we assume it requires another 
discipline to enable it to 'speak'. In their worst-case scenario, poetry accepts a 
subordinate role to philosophy because the truths that poetry is able to convey 
are limited to those 'determined for it in advance by philosophy' (Rapp in 
Marshall (ed.) 1987: 123). The ever-present risk for poetry is of becoming 'a sort 
of splendid vehicle for conceptions which originate elsewhere in belief-systems or 
thought-systems' (Rapp in Marshall (ed.) 1987: 124). Though it would be unfair to 
accuse Aristotle of desiring such a state of affairs, or of unwittingly working 
towards it, I believe Rapp and Edmundson are right in wondering whether 
formally orientated modes of criticism are the only or best mode of bringing 
poetry within the ambit of knowledge. 
In our time the popularity of formalist approaches stems to a large extent from 
the spectacular, intimidating successes of the natural sciences in shaping post-
Renaissance Western culture. Its proponents have argued that only a similarly 
scientific approach can secure objective knowledge in the humanities. It is this 
scientistic7 impulse which underlies literary theory when it sees itself as a 
discipline which must concentrate on those aspects of literary texts which are 
'repeatable' and not dependent on the contingencies of actual readers with their 
7 The Pan Dictionary of Philosophy defines scientism as 'The belief that the human sciences require no 
methods other than those of the natural'. 
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values and prejudices. Because they supposedly exclude the domain of values, 
structural approaches seem to provide a limited but objectively verifiable 
elucidation of aspects of a poem. The paradigmatic gesture in contemporary 
theory is Saussure's bracketing of parole, or actual language use, in favour of 
studying the system, langue, which makes utterances possible. This 
methodological move generates a model that can in principle be applied to any 
signifying practice. For thi& kind of structuralism, a poem and a recipe will do 
equally well. Aside from the langue - parole distinction, Saussure also introduces 
the distinction between the synchronic and the diachronic modes of investigating 
a signifying practice. John Sturrock, in Structuralism and Since, identifies the 
contrast between these two modes as that between studying language as 'a 
system functioning at a given moment in time, [and] as an institution which has 
evolved through time' (Sturrock 1979: 8). To study something synchronically is to 
study it as an isolated system that generates combinatory possibilities. A vital 
Saussurean insight is that meaning is a function of differences at this systemic 
level. That is to say, when we study langue we can't and don't have recourse to 
referentiality to secure the meaning of a sign, but must see its meaning as solely 
a function of its difference from other signs. Meaning, in other words, does not 
reside within a sign as an essence, nor is meaning located in a subject who 
stands at the center of a system and controls it. Both essential meaning and the 
subject are de-centered in favour of a widely conceived 'language': 'It [language] 
is not something we each bring with us into the world at birth, but an institution 
into which we are gradually initiated in childhood as the most fundamental 
element of all in our socialization. Language can thus be described as 
impersonal, it exceeds us as individuals' (Sturrock 1979: 12). 
What are the consequences for thinking about poetry if we adopt this theoretical 
orientation? The first thing to note is that the application of a strict structuralist 
method generates an approach to literary texts which diverges from the way an 
assumed reader would engage with such texts. A structuralist such as Roman 
Jakobson, for example, tends to posit a system of oppositional distributions 
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which structure a particular poem, yet this distribution cannot be supposed to 
signify at the surface level of a reading. His oppositions do not, in other words, 
convincingly account for the overall effect of the poem. In his Structuralist 
Poetics, Jonathan Culler makes the point that 'once one... undertakes a 
distributional analysis of a text, one enters a realm of extraordinary freedom, 
where a grammar. .. no longer provides a determinate method' (Culler 1975: 57). 
There is little constraint to the kinds of oppositions which can be posited, and 
consequently the structuralist approach can come across as a somewhat 
arbitrary exercise. Culler argues that a purely structural analysis has little use in 
itself: 'To say that there is a great deal of parallelism and repetition in literary 
texts is of little interest in itself and of less explanatory value. The crucial question 
is what effects patterning can have, and one cannot approach an answer unless 
one incorporate within one's theory an account of how readers take up and 
structure elements of a text' (Culler 1975: 57). 
Culler's reading of structuralism is directed by his view that a theory of literary 
competence is a necessary supplement to structural considerations if literary 
effects are to be explained. Without getting embroiled in debates about the merits 
of reader-response criticism generally, of which Culler's is one version, I would 
agree with his view that the structural method is above all limited. Sturrock 
expresses this as follows: 'Only a fanatical structuralist would argue that to 
uncover the system of a literary work by means such as these is the whole of 
literary criticism, and that the structuralist holds the ultimate key to literary 
understanding. A moderate structuralism is true to its own tenets, and admits that 
a structuralist interpretation is defined by the differences between it and other 
interpretations' (Sturrock 1979: 12). The limited nature of structuralist literary 
studies may be part of its appeal, but an exclusive emphasis on the formal 
elements of literature separates its study from the realm of values. Such an 
approach would tend to appeal most to those who see in the, supposedly value-
free, orientation of the natural sciences a method which can secure knowledge, 
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rather than mere opinion, for a discipline such as literary criticism too8. In his 
Literary Theory: An Introduction Eagleton praises structuralism for its 
'demystification' of literature, but criticizes its ahistoricity: 'There was no question 
of relating the work to the realities of which it treated, or to the conditions which 
produced it, or to the actual readers who studied it, since the founding gesture of 
structuralism had been to bracket off such realities' (Eagleton 1983: 109). 
Structuralism is thus also unable to account for change, for the diachronic 
movement which is an essential part of what we understand as literature. All 
these considerations combine to make it clear that the limited scope of structural 
analysis relegates it to a marginal role in literary criticism. More generally, it 
seems something of a dead-end to attempt a consistently rigid articulation of 
what may be objective in a work. One feels that a more balanced approach, 
drawing on a wider range of elements introduced by Aristotle in the Poetics than 
its bias towards formal categorization, is possible and necessary in order to 
defend the knowledge claims of poetry. 
Instead of focusing to such an extent on the formal properties of representational 
art, one can follow an alternative route, also deriving from Aristotle, and argue 
that mimesis is a necessary way of gaining access to the truth. Clearly, this 
argument is based on a differing, even conflicting, idea of what 'truth' is from that 
advanced by philosophy. Though poetry does not assert truth, it can, in its 
complex representation, show it. This view can even lead to the contention that 
poetry is suited not only to instruct people in the truth, as argued for example by 
Philip Sidney in his Apology for Poetry, but that it is actually superior to 
philosophy in apprehending the truth. According to this argument, 'reality' is 
characterized by complexity, opaqueness and indeterminacy. Since these are 
generally also characteristics of the self-consciously poetic use of language, 
poetry stands in a privileged relation to the world, in a way that philosophy, as a 
8 Few serious philosophers of science still deny the value-dependency of scientific investigation, for 
example the way it is located within a paradigm which cannot be entirely articulated by its practitioners (cf. 
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) or the extent to which errors and methodological 
inconsistencies act as necessary catalysts for scientific progress (cf. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method). 
18 
more linear, abstract mode of assertion and argument, does not. Plato, of course, 
thinking in terms of a strict division between the sensible and the intelligible, 
would find it incomprehensible that truth could be something provisional or 
vague. For him this is the realm of doxa, mere talk, to be distinguished from the 
realm of knowledge. 
In one strain of Romantic thought the richness of the particular makes it more 
useful than the generalized statements of philosophy in guiding us to an 
understanding of what it is to be human. In the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, for 
example, truth is associated with a poeticized ordinary language, which is 
contrasted with abstract discourse, though Wordsworth's main attack is directed 
at the 'gaudiness and inane phraseology of many modern writers' (Wordsworth 
1992: 59). He makes a case for ordinary language because it does not 'indulge in 
arbitrary and capricious habits of expression, in order to furnish food for fickle 
tastes, and fickle appetites' (Wordsworth 1992: 61). Instead it is the language of 
those who 'hourly communicate with the best objects from which the best part of 
language is originally derived' (Wordsworth 1992: 61 ). Such a language does not 
aim at sating the 'degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation' (Wordsworth 
1992: 65) which characterizes the ever-expanding cities, but can trace 'the 
primary laws of our nature - chiefly, as far as regards the manner in which we 
associate ideas in a state of excitement' (Wordsworth1992: 60). Though 
Wordsworth's contrast of urban and rural culture may be a bit too neat, he does 
give an indication of why, for him, poetry is the 'most philosophic of all writing' 
(Wordsworth 1992: 73). Its truth is not merely a matter of external testimony, but 
is instead 'carried alive into the heart by passion' (Wordsworth 1992: 73). The 
passion that is central to poetry gives it a generality more specialized forms of 
science lack. Thus both the Poet and the Man of Science can lay claim to 
knowledge, but 'the knowledge of the one cleaves to us as a necessary part of 
our existence ... the other is a personal and individual acquisition ... by no habitual 
and direct sympathy connecting us with our fellow-beings' (Wordsworth 1992: 
76). In Wordsworth's scheme of things then, the truly universal is characterized 
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by the kind of passion which can best be conveyed by a poetry attuned to the 
language of ordinary people, a language traversed by basic joys and sorrows, 
embedded in a range of experiences far older than urban sophistications and 
industrialization. The 'primary laws of our nature' are, according to Wordsworth, 
to be found and revealed through a mode which is attuned to them because it is 
as passionate as they are: the colder scrutinies of the specialist are worthwhile 
but far more limited. 
In The Passion of the Western Mind, Richard Tamas usefully contends that 
Western culture since the Renaissance has produced 'two distinct streams of 
culture .... One emerged in the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment and 
stressed rationality, empirical science, and a skeptical secularism. The other was 
its polar complement...tending to express just those aspects of human 
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experience suppressed by the Enlightenment's ... spirit' (Tamas 1991: 366). 
Tamas is quick to point out that this opposition is not a rigid one, nor is it 
exclusive; in fact 'their complex interplay could be said to constitute the modern 
sensibility' (Tamas 1991: 366). Nevertheless, the Enlightenment and the 
'reaction' to it, Romanticism, even if they do have elements in common, differ in 
significant ways that are extremely relevant to the shaping of the historical 
differences between poetry and philosophy. We have already seen that, when 
arguing for the superiority of philosophy, Plato tended to assign rationality to 
philosophers and a non-reflective 'inspiration' to the poets. Tarnas's 
Enlightenment - Romanticism opposition is structured along similar lines: 
'the Romantic vision ... exalted the ineffability of inspiration rather than the 
enlightenment of reason, and affirmed the inexhaustible drama of human 
life rather than the calm predictability of static abstractions. Whereas the 
Enlightenment temperament's high valuation of man rested on his 
unequaled rational intellect and its power to comprehend and exploit the 
laws of nature, the Romantic valued man rather for his imaginative and 
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spiritual aspirations, his emotional depths, his artistic creativity and powers 
of individual self-expression and self-creation' 
(Tamas 1991: 367). 
However, instead of defending the kind of knowledge embedded in poetry, 
we can question the rationality of philosophy, which supposedly guarantees its 
privileged access to truth. Where Wordsworth still claims that poetry can secure 
truth because of its association with passion and non-degraded forms of life, 
Nietzsche inverts the argument and asks whether philosophy is not perhaps a 




NIETZSCHE AND THE POETRY IN PHILOSOPHY 
Historically, the opposition between poetry and philosophy has been maintained 
within philosophy as a strategic move: the repression of poetry, as an instance of 
the more generalized banishment of the Other, is arguably the gesture which 
inaugurates philosophy as a discipline with quasi-autonomous aims and 
methods. Truth, then, can only inhere in what can be assimilated into the 
discourses of philosophy. The inassimilable residue, poetry for instance, may 
possess value, but not that highest value which is accorded the status of 
'philosophical truth'. It is characteristic of philosophy that it rates its own status as 
securer and protector of truth so highly. Philosophers have implicitly, often 
explicitly, held that philosophical discourse is the final vocabulary for assessing 
claims and creating a unified field of knowledge. In Hegel, for instance, 
philosophy assimilates by dialectic and culminates in wholly self-transparent, 
thus absolute, knowledge. In Continental Philosophy since 1750, Robert 
Solomon points to the conceit of such a view, and the kind of behaviour it has 
sanctioned historically. In discussing the heightened concept of the self which 
finds its initial articulation in Descartes' cogito and attains its apotheosis in the 
German Idealists and in the general confidence in reason and rational progress 
which defines the Enlightenment, Solomon employs the useful phrase 
'transcendental pretence', which he describes as 'the unwarranted assumption 
that there is universality and necessity in the fundamental modes of human 
experience' (Solomon 1988: 7). Clearly the Kantian project to identify the 
necessary a priori structures of consciousness assumes that the results of such 
an investigation would be both universal and necessary, that is to say, 
transcendental. And surely most philosophers have posited a connection 
between the use of reason and the universality of any philosophical conclusions 
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so arrived at. What is true locally, it would seem, is hardly true at all. The 
contingency of the empirical, the non-linearity of metaphor, cannot constitute 
philosophy proper. 
Yet we see, as part of the complex reaction to the Enlightenment, an increasing 
seriousness accorded to the question of whether philosophy could perhaps exist 
if reason were conceived in a more limited way. Kant expresses his intention to 
'limit knowledge, in order to make room for faith' (Solomon 1988: 26), though his 
is still an essentially grandiose conception: a re-conceived reason continues to 
reign supreme in those realms accorded to it. Shelley contrasts reason and 
imagination: 'the former may be considered as mind contemplating the relations 
borne by one thought to another, however produced; and the latter, as mind 
acting upon those thoughts so as to colour them with its own light' (Shelley 1977: 
480). He then goes on to explicitly privilege imagination: 'Reason is to 
Imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, as the 
shadow to the substance' (Shelley 1977: 480). And in Nietzsche we find the 
radical urge to come to terms with reason's 'Other', with the possibility that there 
exists a necessary abyss within thought. Nietzsche takes more seriously than 
most philosophers the prevalence of irrationality and the problem of what cannot 
be wholly understood or assimilated. To take it more seriously than he does 
would perhaps entail ceasing to be a philosopher at all. He also recognizes the 
power language has in shaping philosophical prejudices, especially in terms of 
the role of metaphor as a primary ground for conceptual thinking. In pursuing 
these questions he has produced a body of writing situated along the boundaries 
that have historically distinguished philosophy from other practices. I begin this 
chapter with a general discussion of metaphor, before looking in detail at 
Nietzsche's position. 
The Aristotelian definition of metaphor is well-known: 'Metaphor consists in giving 
the thing a name that belongs properly to something else; the transference being 
either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to 
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species, or on grounds of analogy' (Aristotle 1963: 36). The neatness of this 
formulation, however, does not mean that it is so easy, in practice, to isolate the 
linguistic qualities which constitute the 'metaphorical'. In Knowledge 
Representation and Metaphor, EC Way gives a convincing range of examples to 
demonstrate that metaphors do not necessarily inhere in a particular syntactic 
form, or always stand in the same specifiable relation to literal utterance. She 
summarizes as follows: 'metaphor cannot be reliably distinguished from literal 
language at the level of word, or even at the level of individual sentences. 
Metaphor does not fit into any particular syntactic pattern and it can take any 
mood. We have also seen that ideas and objects that are not explicitly mentioned 
in the actual metaphor are often essential to its understanding' (Way 1991: 16). 
The range of linguistic features demonstrated by metaphor has tempted many 
thinkers to attempt to identify it by contrasting it with a supposedly more literal 
form of language. 
Philosophical positivism, in its various strains, sought especially to deny 
metaphor any claim to truth or knowledge. It sought to distinguish rigidly between 
a metaphoric statement and a literal statement, with a literal statement typically 
being the only one accorded cognitive content. In his Wittgenstein and Metaphor 
Jerry H. Gill cites Paul Edwards' representative version of this approach, in terms 
of which 'unless a statement is 'reducible' to a 'literal equivalent' it is 'devoid of 
cognitive meaning"(Gill 1981: 5). Though Aristotle considers the ability to 
formulate a good metaphor an indication of genius, since it rests on the 
'perception of the similarity in dissimilars' (Aristotle 1963: 40, 41) he too frames 
metaphor as a deviation from ordinary language, because it assigns a thing a 
name that properly belongs to something else. Such an account paves the way 
for seeing poetry itself, a pre-eminently metaphorical mode, as little more than a 
kind of deviation from more factual ways of language use. 
The first problem with this argument is that we clearly use metaphors 
successfully without assigning to them a separate cognitive content, or literalizing 
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them as part of the process of understanding: 'Not only is it not true that people 
learn to use and understand metaphors by 'projecting from', and 'reducing to', 
certain statements about observable features, it is decidedly not the case that 
people who use and understand metaphors can supply the 'literal equivalent' 
when called upon to do so' (Gill 1981: 7). Metaphor does not seem to be a mere 
distortion of language, a deviation from a norm which can be recovered if we 
retrace our steps. Those who argue that it is tend also to posit the, now 
somewhat discredited, ideal of a literal language which is connected to an 
autonomous empirical reality in such a way that language mirrors it, and truth is a 
matter of accuracy of correspondence. According to Way: 'Literal meaning is 
supposed to be the 'true' meaning that words have, independently of when and 
how they are used. Thus, literal meaning is seen to be what is captured in a 
dictionary; it is supposed to be context-free, generally accepted usage' (Way 
1991: 16). This view of language leads directly to a second problem, namely that 
the claims made for a strict literal language, claims needed in order to sustain the 
literal-metaphorical opposition, do not really stand up to scrutiny. It soon 
becomes apparent that the entire model is suspect, at least insofar as it purports 
to be an essential distinction. For 'ordinary' language is itself permeated by 
metaphors, albeit often so-called 'dead metaphors', metaphors which have been 
in usage for so long that we conventionally treat them as though they referred 
directly to a state of affairs. Some examples that Way gives are: ' 'running water', 
'the stem of a glass', 'the foot of a mountain', and 'the lea of a bookn (Way 1991: 
16). Clearly these are metaphors in that they link two fields of meaning which 
have no essential or previous connection. Equally clearly, almost any language 
segment will contain such uses of language, taken for granted in the context in 
which they are used. 
Once it is recognized that iTietaphor is linguistically varied and very pervasive, 
that it is, in other words, not a specialized technique we occasionally employ, but 
in some way central to language, only a small further step is needed to assert 
that 'all is metaphor'. Gill calls this the constitutive notion of metaphor, according 
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to which our very sense of reality rests upon a metaphorical ground which we 
can never literalize. Language does seem always already to involve a 'going 
beyond' the facts of perception, and what we call our 'world' or our 'reality' is not 
just something out there we talk about using the instrument of language, but 
comes into being, in other words is constituted, as a function of language. 
However, Way points out that, in one sense, the assertion that everything is 
metaphorical is quite trivial. Language is clearly not a thing amongst other things 
in the physical realm. It does not possess materiality in the way a table does, and 
so using language would necessarily involve the yoking together of qualitatively 
different realms. When I talk about a table I am using patterns of sound, not 
wood. Language rests on a tension between presence and absence: what we 
refer to is usually absent, though rendered precariously present in discourse. But 
do we clarify anything when we say that this process, which defines all language, 
is 'metaphorical'? Clearly, if we assert such a pervasiveness for metaphor, we 
are no longer making a useful linguistic distinction between types of language as 
they are used, but offering a quasi-metaphysical interpretation of the way 
language and world are related: one which emphasizes the power of language to 
constitute, rather than to passively mirror. Here the danger is one of 
reductionism. One can, in fact, point out that we 'make' our world by creating 
metaphors, and that the possibility of having a world depends on this non-
reducible activity, and nevertheless hold, without contradiction, that there are 
good reasons to retain some sort of distinction between 'literal' and 'metaphoric' 
on a pragmatic or linguistic level. I believe we obscure more than we reveal when 
. we level all language to instances of the 'metaphorical', for we then diminish the 
interest we might have in details, in local differences between various language 
uses. 
In this regard Way argues that 'literal' is a genuine concept with a variable 
meaning which depends on the context. In other words, it serves a purpose in 
ordinary language. According to Way, we use the word to mean something 
similar to 'really', 'truly' or 'actually'. Thus, for example, we say 'I scrubbed that 
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floor literally on my hands and knees' and what we mean is that we are not being 
ironic or facetious. We really did scrub the floor. Here 'literal' does not refer to a 
non-negotiable dictionary meaning, but has a pragmatic function as a speaker's 
indication of a certain relation of seriousness to her utterance. It does this by 
excluding more figurative or fanciful uses and what they imply: 'The function of 
'literal' is not to contribute positively to the characterization of anything, but to 
exclude possible ways of being non-literal' 0fVay 1991: 20). Issues arising from 
this problematic underlie a great deal of what follows and will hopefully be 
deepened as well as clarified as I go along. My use of a term such as 'pragmatic', 
for example, and the assumptions on which my position rests, will themselves 
have to be scrutinized critically. 
We have, provisionally, two related though differentiated senses of the term 
'metaphor': as referring to the way language constitutes our world for us and, 
more modestly, as a kind of language use opposed on a pragmatic level to the 
non-metaphorical. How does this understanding of metaphor relate to our 
understanding of what poetry and philosophy are? I believe the main discursive 
convention of poetry is that it not be taken to refer to the world in the same way 
as non-literary texts, such as philosophical ones. For Plato, poetry exists in a 
space characterized by the foregrounding of those elements of language which 
more instrumentally rational conceptions should attempt to suppress or keep 
under strict control. Those elements are of course the figurative dimension of 
language, especially metaphor. The general question of the relationship between 
poetry and philosophy cannot really be divorced from the consideration of the 
part explicit and suppressed metaphors play in each. 
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The first problem any would-be interpreter of Nietzsche must grapple with is the 
extent to which it is justifiable to present his oeuvre (much of which only exists as 
posthumously published fragments) as though a clear, conceptually cohesive 
doctrine could be extracted from it. From where are we to approach a thinker 
who considered the limitations of one perspective both inevitable, and inevitably 
misleading? In Nietzsche'~ case it would be particularly inappropriate to pretend 
that such a thing as a neutral, interest-free vantage point exists for interpretation. 
More than any major thinker he delights as much in iconoclastic hyperbole and 
the pathos of the mask as in more linear forms of presentation. It has been 
alleged that even Heidegger's seminal reading of Nietzsche is a specious 
thematization which, in its drive to interpretive closure, reduces Nietzsche's 
complexity to a handful of convenient key concepts at the expense of the 'play' in 
Nietzsche. Two contemporary commentators who do not endorse Heidegger's 
'methodological' choice are Alan Schrift and Christopher Norris. In his Nietzsche 
and the Question of Interpretation: Hermeneutics, Deconstruction, Pluralism, 
Schrift suggests that 'only a decentered reading of Nietzsche's philosophy can 
hope to follow the path of his thinking as the Dionysian play of world-construction 
and world-destruction' (Sch rift 1985: 100). Similarly Norris, in Deconstruction: 
Theory and Practice, asserts that 'The unsettling power of Nietzsche's text is 
such as to place it beyond reach of a philosophy aimed, like Heidegger's, 
towards truth and the ultimate presence of meaning' (Norris 1982: 70). 
I begin then, not with a doctrine, but with a problem, that of Nietzsche's language 
and his style of writing. A typical first impression of Nietzsche concerns his 
stylistic diversion from the philosophical norm. For Eric Blonde!, in the essay 
'Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor', it is 'such a peculiar use of language, one so rare 
among philosophers' (Blondel in Allison (ed.) 1977: 150). Michael Haar's essay, 
'Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language', collected in the same volume, begins in 
28 
a similar vein by asking whether Nietzsche might not be 'more inaccessible, more 
unapproachable, and more inevitably 'betrayed', than any philosopher before or 
since' (Haar in Allison (ed.) 1977: 5). Why is Nietzsche so uniquely predisposed 
to being misread? Firstly, according to Haar, there is the deceptive readability of 
his style, its 'literariness'. Because it does not seem technical, but instead 
appears as a loose collection of polemic, poetic and aphoristic elements, the 
illusion is created 'that this philosopher lay within easy reach of everybody' (Haar 
in Allison (ed.) 1977: 5). But more significant than this, Haar contends, is the fact 
that Nietzsche's language, 'a strange and ambiguous language' (Haar in Allison 
(ed.) 1977: 5), is intended as a language of subversion: 'Nietzsche develops, in 
direct opposition to the tradition and its language, a language of his own, a form 
particularly insinuating, insidious, complex' (Haar in Allison (ed.) 1977: 6). 
Subversion of what? Nietzsche's style is intended to invite us to consider that the 
poetic and/or metaphoric is in some way essentially constitutive, as opposed to 
merely incidental (as example, illustration and so forth) of the mode of discourse 
called 'philosophy'. Nietzsche presents us with the possibility of a way of thinking 
in which metaphor is not incidental to that which is conveyed, but an essential 
aspect of it. Blondel writes in this regard that Nietzsche's use of metaphor is 
'demanded by a specifically philosophical necessity' (Blondel in Allison (ed.) 
1977). And Haar implicitly agrees with Schrift's critique of Heidegger when he 
contrasts concepts in the classical sense with key Nietzschean terms: 'Whereas 
a concept.. .comprises and contains, in an identical and total manner, the content 
that it assumes, most of Nietzsche's key words bring forth ... a plurality of 
meanings undermining any logic based on the principle of identity' (Haar in 
Allison (ed.) 1977: 6). 
In the discussion that follows I will mainly use Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy 
and the essay 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral sense'. In the latter Nietzsche 
29 
explicitly and powerfully thinks through the distinction between concept and 
metaphor; as such it is one of the texts most referred to by post-structuralists9. 
Nietzsche here claims that conceptual language is inappropriate for grasping the 
truth, and that the concept is in fact no more than a metaphor which has 
forgotten its origins. Considering the first claim, Nietzsche asserts that 'Every 
concept arises from the equation of unequal things' (Breazeale (ed.) 1979: 83). 
The concept, when measured against the data of the senses, is fundamentally 
and necessarily imprecise, because when we use a concept we use it in such a 
way that we bestow identity on what is in fact only similarity: 'Just as it is certain 
that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept 
'leaf is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by 
forgetting the distinguishing aspects' (Breazeale (ed.) 1979: 83). The concept 
cannot do justice to particularity, to the rich diversity of what simply is, because it 
is required to fit countless similar cases. It has no regard for difference. But not 
only is the concept inaccurate, it is also not primary~ It is, in fact, merely the 
'residue of a metaphor' (Breazeale (ed.) 1979: 85). Nietzsche argues that the 
world is interpretation all the way through, that it is 'metaphorical' inasmuch as 
language is not and can never be the adequate expression of reality. In an 
obscure, but interesting passage, Blonde! reminds us that the original sense of 
meta-phorical is transport or transposition, a going beyond the raw data by 
interpreting or representing it, and that metaphor, as Nietzsche broadly uses the 
9Though existing in a comparatively complete and polished form, this essay nevertheless forms part of the 
assemblage of jottings, fragments and drafts never published by Nietzsche in his lifetime, the so-called 
Nachlass. We do need to face the problem of the status that is to be accorded these texts, texts not explicitly 
approved for publication by their author. This is especially so given their history of being presented in a 
falsified manner to portray Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi. In my opinion, Daniel Breazeale's introduction to 
Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's identifies useful criteria 
for employing material from the Nachlass. According to Breazeale, the Nachlass is properly employed if 
the following criteria are met: '(1) Quotations from and references to Nietzsche's unpublished writings 
should always be identified as such ... (2) When views expressed in the Nachlass seem to conflict with 
views encountered in Nietzsche's published writings, mention must be made of this conflict. .. (3) Priority 
should always be given to published over unpublished remarks on the same topic' (Breazeale 1979: xviii). 
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term, designates 'the separation between body and thought, a kind of 
displacement that has structured the development of culture since its very 
inception' (Blondel in Allison (ed.) 1977: 151 ). I take this to mean that for 
Nietzsche, as for Freud, self-consciousness is a late arrival, an extension of 
unconscious and bodily activity, consequently an effect more than a cause or 
origin. All thought is metaphorical inasmuch as it creates meaning from what can 
never be wholly present. In 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', Nietzsche 
introduces the notion of 'overleaping of spheres', which explains how meaning is 
eventually derived from the inarticulate processes of the body: 'a nerve stimulus 
is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is initiated in a 
sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one 
sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one' (Breazeale (ed.) 
1979 82). This is a linguistically-orientated scepticism resting on the 
unknowability of the world an sich: 'we believe that we know something about the 
things themselves ... yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things - metaphors 
which correspond in no way to the original entities' (Breazeale (ed.) 1979: 83). 
This scepticism, however, is not the end of Nietzsche's thought but its beginning, 
since it paves the way for a re-assessment of truth, one which is now freed to 
consider the role of power and desire in thinking and in knowledge claims. The 
critique of the concept as an inaccurate and forgotten metaphor is seminally 
expressed in one of the most-quoted passages from Nietzsche, which I include 
here in its entirety precisely because it has been so influential: 
'What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been 
poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and 
which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and 
binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are 
metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of 
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sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now 
considered as metal and no longer as coins' 
(Breazeale (ed.) 1979: 84). 
Norris, after quoting part of this passage, comments as follows: 'For Nietzsche 
this insight led to the conclusion that all philosophies, whatever their claim to 
logic or reason, rested on a shifting texture of figurative language, the signs of 
which were systematically repressed under the sovereign order of truth' (Norris 
1982: 58). Nietzsche's position seems an instance of the view, discussed earlier, 
that the world is constituted metaphorically in a fundamental way. Proponents of 
this view tend to start with the insight that words and things are not the same, 
and conclude that 'all is metaphor'. But it is Nietzsche's explanation of why such 
a basic insight has been suppressed by philosophy that make his thought so 
powerful. 
Why, in other words, this forgetting of metaphor? Why has truth been conceived 
as a correspondence between thought and thing, between concept and reality? 
Why the disavowal of thought's origin in an archaic, creative activity? In 
Nietzsche and Metaphor, Sarah Kofman answers as follows: 'Previously 
philosophy and science, in the desire to speak 'properly' and demonstrate 
without using images or similes in order to be convincing, repressed metaphor .... 
By bestowing highly precise limits on the metaphorical he [the philosopher] was 
able to hide the fact that the conceptual is itself metaphorical' (Kofman 1993: 17). 
For Kofman, following Nietzsche, the forgetting of metaphoric origins leads to the 
devaluation of metaphorical activity. The simultaneous ascendance of the 
concept, and of the philosopher as the master of the concept, represents the 
move toward a misguided asceticism that traverses Western culture. She argues 
that metaphor is an expression of abundance, of a will to life, and that the ascetic 
ideal can only appeal to a form of life which 'is able to impoverish the world by 
reducing it to the narrow and ugly measure of the concept' (Kofman 1993: 20). 
Through the concept the piay of becoming is subordinated to philosophical 
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language, 'the most unsatisfactory there is, for it petrifies the 'music of the world' 
into concepts' (Kofman 1993: 13). Certainly life organized conceptually is safer, 
as our experiences are located within the stabilizing, familiarizing agency of 
abstraction. According to Nietzsche: 'Only by forgetting this primitive world of 
metaphor can one live with any repose, security and consistency: only by means 
of the petrification and coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed 
from the primal faculty of the human imagination[,] ... only by forgetting that he 
himself is an artistically creating subject' (Breazeale (ed.) 1979: 86). 
Thought that recognizes itself as metaphoric, and celebrates this play of 
differences and non-identity, is to be praised because it is honest in recognizing 
its own creativity. For the supposedly given it substitutes the made. It is a 
question of the value of differing ways of life: for Nietzsche there is no such thing 
as value-free thought. There is no truth which is not my truth or your truth. After 
Nietzsche it becomes philosophically possible to ask primarily after the value of a 
particular view. We may then ask the very Nietzschean question of what the 
scheme of values and prejudices is that underlies this account of the relationship 
between poetry and philosophy. 
The Birth of Tragedy is marked by the opposition between Dionysian excess and 
Apollonian control, much in the way that 'concept' and 'metaphor' structure 'On 
Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense'. 'Apollonian' and 'Dionysian' are archetypes 
which are analogous to dreaming and drunkenness. They exist 'for the most part 
openly at variance' (Nietzsche 1995: 1 ). Nietzsche here depicts philosophy as 
the effort to 'discipline refractory energies' (Edmundson 1995: 11 ), as the attempt 
to univocalize the complex energies of the Dionysian through a confidence in 
reason which is allied to an overly optimistic view of the world. Concerning 
Apollo, Nietzsche writes of 'that measured restraint, that freedom from the wilder 
emotions, that philosophical calm of the sculptor-god' (Nietzsche 1995: 3). But if 
there is pleasure in the control of the self, there is nevertheless also the ecstasy 
of the breakdown of the self, the Dionysian state, when one is 'suddenly unable 
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to account for the cognitive forms of a phenomenon, when the principle of 
reason, in some one of its manifestations, seems to admit of an exception' 
(Nietzsche 1995: 3). The Dionysian is the pleasure of being re-united with all that 
is lost through reason's individuation: 'Under the charm of the Dionysian, not only 
is the union between man and man reaffirmed, but Nature which has become 
estranged, hostile or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with 
her prodigal son, man' (Nietzsche 1995: 4). 
Philosophy, represented by Socrates, is unable to comprehend Attic tragedy, as 
the complex reconciliation of the Apollonian and the Dionysian, because it cannot 
comprehend the Dionysian as the necessary Other of reason. It celebrates only 
light, not the patterning of light and darkness. According to Nietzsche, the 
Socratic optimist believes that if we possess knowledge of the good, we will see 
it as the only way to secure true happiness, and will act accordingly: 'Socrates is 
the prototype of the theoretical optimist who with his belief in the explicability of 
the nature of things, attributes to knowledge and perception the power of 
universal panacea, and in error sees evil in itself (Nietzsche 1995: 54). For 
Socrates, the only reason people don't always do good is because they lack 
adequate knowledge of how it is to their advantage. Clearly this is an optimistic 
valuation of the part reason plays in our social and ethical lives. We can contrast 
it, for example, with the view of the protagonist in Dostoevsky's Notes from 
Underground: 
'Who has ever. .. seen men acting solely for the sake of advantage? What's 
to be done with the millions of facts that attest to their knowingly- that is, 
with full awareness of their true interests - dismissing these interests as 
secondary and rushing off in another direction, at risk, at hazard, without 
anyone or anything compelling them to do so, but as if solely in order to 
reject the designated road, and stubbornly, willfully carving out another - a 
difficult, absurd one - seeking it out virtually in the dark?' 
(Dostoevsky 1974: 22). 
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For Nietzsche, rational optimism, historically allied to philosophy, fails to 
recognize that the exclusive pursuit of Apollonian health, a health of the intellect 
only, distances a culture from the 'irrational' experiences necessary for its 
perpetual renewal. As cultural diagnostician, Nietzsche believes modernity is 
characterized by the lack of meaningful reconciliation between the 'abstract man' 
of a purely Apollonian culture, and the primary contemporary representative of 
the Dionysian, the 'artist'. It is worth emphasizing that in the absence of a true 
reconciliation and a genuine mythological foundation, both poles are equally 
adrift. The destruction of myth gives us a 'culture which has no fixed and sacred 
primitive seat, but is doomed to exhaust all its possibilities, and to nourish itself 
wretchedly on all other cultures' (Nietzsche 1995: 85). Within this culture we find 
the problem of the 'abstract man ... the abstract education, the abstract morality, 
the abstract justice, the abstract state' (Nietzsche 1995: 85), but also the 'lawless 
roving of the artistic imagination, unchecked by native myth' (Nietzsche 1995: 
85). 
It is worth emphasizing that Nietzsche is not simply rhapsodizing the Dionysian. 
The Birth of Tragedy is not a philosophical poem in praise of excess, but a 
depiction of the power of a temporary reconciliation between two archetypal 
possibilities. Too many commentators have over-emphasized Nietzsche's praise 
of excess and metaphoricity at the expense of his sense of dialectical tension. 
For Nietzsche, tragedy is the momentary equilibrium of the Apollonian and the 
Dionysian, and it is only through 'a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic will' 
(Nietzsche 1995: 1) that this reconciliation is possible. Commentators who view 
this text as a conflict between two forces, one 'good', because 'spontaneous', the 
other 'bad' because 'repressive', fail to do justice to the complexity of Nietzsche's 
-
argument. Nietzsche does not collapse the Apollonian into the Dionysian here, or 
the conceptual into the metaphorical. 
35 
Though Nietzsche pushes the critique of philosophy to the point of breakdown, 
he does not jettison philosophy, leaving us with only poetry or the Dionysian. 
Though he is one of the few philosophers to value poetry at least as highly as 
philosophy, I do not believe that his reassessment presents so simple a solution 
as that all thought is 'poetic' or metaphorical, if this is taken to mean that there 
are no legitimate reasons for at times wishing to distinguish between a 'concept' 
and a 'metaphor'. According to Kofman, for Nietzsche philosophy cannot be 
assimilated into any of the existing categories. It is neither exclusively poetry nor 
exclusively science. Its aims are those of art, but its means are those of science 
(Kofman 1993: 1 ). Though Nietzsche presents one of the most compelling 
versions of the argument that metaphor is fundamentally constitutive, he also 
maintains a sense of the diverse possible ways of using language. 
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CHAPTER3 
METAPHOR, DIFFERANCE, POST-STRUCTURALISM 
! 
A tendency found in many works associated with post-structuralism is precisely 
the denial of differences between ways of using language, due to the elevation of 
the metaphorical, and the accompanying diminishment of the status of the 
concept. At times this can become an uncritical reduction of all understanding to 
metaphorical understanding, of all language to metaphorical language. According 
to this view the conceptual is neither 'true' nor 'desirable', but instead is a more 
or less misguided attempt to ask thought to perform what it, by its very nature, 
cannot do. One may well ask whether this positing of an 'Ur-metaphoricity' is not 
in fact a hankering after a kind of metaphysical closure, albeit in the garb of the 
age. Kofman sounds a similar warning early in Nietzsche and Metaphor. 'the 
tyranny of anyone seeking simply to invert the terms and commend the value of 
metaphor alone is equally reprehensible: he remains ensnared in the same 
system of thought as the metaphysician' (Kofman 1993:3). The question which 
frames this chapter is whether the elevation of the metaphorical is not precisely 
such an instance of speciously over-deploying an insight which is now 
recognized as a truism, namely that language is 'metaphorical'. 
I begin with a long extract which, in my opinion, is representative, both in its 
method of arguing and in the conclusions derived from it, of a wide-spread style 
of post-structuralist discourse: 
'Nietzsche denies the fundamental correspondence between the signifier 
and the signified: the word never expresses an identical meaning, much 
less an identical object. There is no order of meaning independent of the 
words or signs used to designate them. Consequently, there is no 
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transcendent meaning, no ideal signification, no privileged reference, no 
univocal equation between 'designations' and 'things'. The use of words is 
entirely conventional, and their signification consists in the manipulation of 
other words - convenient, agreed-upon fictions, that out of habit pass as 
representatives or rude equivalents for our own perceptual images. If the 
strict univocal reference between word and object, word and meaning, is 
thus denied, it follows that the classical concept of propositional truth 
becomes an impossibility- and this is due precisely to the primacy of 
metaphor' 
(Allison (ed.) 1977: xv, xvi). 
To begin with, Allison is not really talking about Nietzsche here. The salvaging 
phrase 'and this is due precisely to the primacy of metaphor' sits uneasily with 
what precedes it. The views Allison is presenting for us are, I would argue, rather 
based on an influential post"."structuralist reading of Ferdinand de Saussure, 
which sees him as endorsing a non-referential theory of language. Allison begins 
by perpetuating what has by now become an uncritical distortion of Saussure, in 
that he demonstrates no awareness of the difference in Saussure's thought 
between the signifier-signified relation and the sign-referent relation, but seems 
to want to use them interchangeably. For Saussure the relationship between 
signifier and signified is marked. by negativity: their meaning is not referential but 
the result of difference. However, Saussure makes a methodological choice to 
study language as synchronic system (langue), and explicitly brackets the 
problem of discourse (parole), which can be understood as language in use. 
According to Raymond Tallis, 'Saussure himself contrasts the negativity of the 
signifier and the·signified with the positivity that results from their fusion in the 
realised linguistic sign - the actual verbal token as it appears in discourse' (Tallis 
1995: 69). It seems mistaken to take a provisional methodological move such as 
the bracketing of actual language-use (where the problem of reference is 
located) and use it as supposed proof that referentiality can no longer be taken 
seriously. If we choose to study language as a self-contained system then it is 
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neither surprising nor significant that it appears to us as a self-contained system. 
Allison, like many post-structuralists, does not take the distinction between 
system and utterance seriously enough. 
We do not have to defend a simplistic understanding of referentiality, where a 
sign refers univocally to an object, to recognize the referential dimension. I agree 
with Allison that the conventional element is primary in language use. But the 
conventionality of words does not mean that they are non-referential: 
conventions function rather as constraints on how a particular referent and a 
particular sign link up. Allison's account seems to imply that language in use, 
discourse in other words, is not about anything save itself. He does not consider 
referentiality understood as a function of context and use in a communicative 
situation, but instead sets a specious standard for language to meet and then 
seems to think that the case for scepticism has been clinched. The following 
sentence, already quoted above, demonstrates this tendency clearly: 'If the strict 
univocal reference between word and object, word and meaning, is thus denied, 
it follows that the classical concept of propositional truth becomes an 
impossibility'. 'Strict univocal reference' is far from the only meaningful referential 
option at our disposal, and the 'classical concept of propositional truth' can be 
denied without language therefore ceasing to be about the world in some way. 
Allison attempts to deny any non-metaphorical referential relationship between 
language and world, using a fairly typical range of arguments and 
presuppositions to conclude that language cannot secure truth because it cannot 
correspond to the world except 'metaphorically'. It should be clear that what is at 
work here is really a metaphorical 'reductionism'. As was said earlier, the mere 
insight that language does not possess materiality in the way a table does, does 
not mean that all language necessarily fulfills the same function. In his An 
Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodemism, Madan Sarup 
gives another example of this type of thinking at work: 
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'literature can no longer be seen as a kind of poor relation to philosophy. 
There is no clear division between literature and philosophy, nor between 
'criticism' and 'creation'. Since metaphors are essentially 'groundless', 
mere substitutions of one set of signs for another, language tends to 
betray its own fictive and arbitrary nature at just those points where it is 
offering to be most intensely persuasive. In short, philosophy, law and 
political theory work by metaphor just as poems do, and so are just as 
fictional' 
(Sarup 1988: 47). 
Here a mild opening claim, 'there is no clear division between literature and 
philosophy', shifts almost imperceptibly into the far more general and problematic 
assertion that philosophy, law and political theory are all equally fictional, without 
any support except the notion that they all work by metaphor, just like poems do. 
One must ask: what do we lose, and what do we gain, by conflating a poem and 
a law as both being 'metaphorical' constructions? Though a law and a poem both 
contain the linguistic phenomenon of metaphoricity, are they really equally 
fictional? Surely the notion of a metaphor is being stretched beyond all 
usefulness here? 
!! 
It would be foolish to grapple with these issues and not involve one of 
contemporary theory's most significant post-Nietzscheans: Jacques Derrida. 
Derrida's work, like Nietzsche's, is too complex and multi-faceted to allow simple 
encapsulation. I will not pretend that I am giving an exhaustive treatment of it, or 
that such a treatment is in principle possible or desirable, but will limit myself to 
those aspects of his texts which bear on the problem of metaphor and the more 
general topic of the relationship between poetry and philosophy. In this regard a 
useful place to start is the attempt to determine what Derrida means when he 
uses the terms writing and differance. However, Derrida has, in 'Letter to a 
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Japanese Friend', made it clear that such terms, as well as the overused 
'deconstruction', are not to be understood as concepts or privileged signifieds 
which are intended to halt the play of meaning and indeterminacy in Derrida's 
own discourse. They are strategic terms with a strategic purpose. One must even 
ask whether they are intended to be portable, whether Derridean terms are not in 
fact highly specific to a particular moment of engagement with a text and a 
tradition. The commentator, wishing to engage with Derrida, must however 
provisionally act as though their meaning were stable and accessible. I will 
consequently attribute a measure of stability to Derridean terms, but hopefully not 
proceed as though they mapped out once and for all a conceptual ground in its 
totality. The emphasis will fall on Derrida as a strategic philosopher, in much the 
same way as the later Wittgenstein conceived of his work as a form of 'therapy'. 
A crucial Derridean point, derived from Nietzsche; is that the problem of textuality 
is as central to philosophy as it is to literature. The difference is not that 
philosophy has access to a method which exempts it from the problems we 
associate with texts, but that philosophy is a kind of writing which often does not 
want to be writing. According to Christopher Norris, in his Derrida, the 
philosopher 'may be defined as the one who habitually forgets that s/he is 
writing' (Norris 1987: 21 ). Since Plato, philosophy has generally understood itself 
as the attempt to open up a space where the problem of the figurative has been 
banished. In this space an appropriately serious group of interlocutors avail 
themselves of a dialectic which progresses towards truth as its telos, without 
shifting into polysemanticity or the rupture of incommensurable arguments. 
Richard Rorty's essay on Derrida, 'Philosophy as a kind of writing', suggests that 
an appropriate way to begin the reading of Derrida is to see his work as 
attempting to answer the question: 'What must philosophers think writing is that 
they resent so much the suggestion that this is what they do?' (Rorty 1982: 95). 
Why is philosophy afraid of writing in the Derridean sense? The Derridean 
argument engages with the philosophical ideal of a language which is 
transparent before itself and before the facts. Rorty makes the point that, for 
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many philosophers, the less language the better: 'what is really wanted is to 
show, to demonstrate, to point out, to exhibit, to make one's interlocutor stand at 
gaze before the world' (Rorty 1982: 94). An end to writing is always being 
posited, when the representation will correspond to the represented, when 
perception will be immediate and a neutral 'observation-language' will record 
nothing but what is logically consistent and I or empirically verifiable. For Derrida, 
on the other hand, 'writing always leads to more writing, and more, and still more' 
(Rorty 1982: 94). 
According to Derrida, the distrust of writing structures the texts of Plato, 
Saussure, Levi-Strauss, Rousseau and others. In 'Plato's Pharmacy', Derrida 
looks in detail at the opposition between speech and writing as Plato conceives it 
in his Phaedrus. Derrida makes much of the word pharmakon which is used by 
Plato and which is irreducibly ambiguous in that it denotes both a remedy and a 
poison. Writing as conceiv~d in this Platonic dialogue is pre-eminently a 
pharmakon. It is conceived as a remedy for forgetfulness, but it is also a poison 
because it is able to function in the absence of its origin: 'through writing ... the 
genealogical break and the estrangement from the origin are sounded' (Derrida 
1993: 74). If writing can function in the absence of its origin, this means it can 
function in the absence of intentionality as a limit to its possible meanings. The 
control exercised over discourse by a speaker and a listener in a dialogic 
situation supposedly works to guarantee a degree of semantic and conceptual 
closure. By contrast, writing leaves home, and can yield all sorts of meanings to 
all sorts of strangers. In its uncontrollable dissemination there is no telling the 
effect it may have on the social. 
Phonocentrism is the term Derrida uses for the dream of Western philosophy that 
the sense of self-presence which characterizes the circuit of speaking and 
hearing oneself speak be the model of philosophical communication. We seem to 
speak and understand without the bypass of interpretation, without the deferral of 
meaning, and it is tempting to believe that this transparency, so clearly not 
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available in our interaction with written texts, is due to the privileged status of 
speech. In the words of Christopher Norris: 'Voice becomes a metaphor of truth 
and authenticity, a source of self-present 'living' speech as opposed to the 
secondary lifeless emanations of writing' (Norris 1982: 28). For Sarup, the 
contrast is one between the immediacy of speech and the mediation of writing: 
'unlike writing, which is hopelessly mediated, speech is linked to the apparent 
moment and place of presence and for this reason has had priority' (Sarup 1988: 
36). Derrida's strategy is to deconstruct this supposed binary privileging by 
showing that speech is constituted by the same structure as writing, that it also 
necessarily demonstrates the logic of differance. Differance is a neologism which 
can mean both to 'differ' and to 'defer'. In fact, 'its sense remains suspended 
between the two French verbs' (Norris 1982: 32). Two elements of language, as 
Derrida understands it, are highlighted by the use of this term. Firstly, that -
language is a differential system. Following Saussure, meaning in language is 
dependent on a term's place in a system rather than what it refers to. But not 
only is meaning the result of difference: it is also endlessly deferred. The signifier 
as word-mark and the signified as 'mental image' or concept which attends that 
signifier are arbitrarily linked but generate one another in use. The 'concept' cat 
generated by the signifier 'cat' can only be understood by the use of further 
signifiers such as 'four-legged' and 'furry', themselves of course understood as 
signifieds: 'Meaning is continually moving along a chain of signifiers, and we 
cannot be precise about its exact 'location" (Sarup 1988: 33). In its deferral of a 
simply present meaning differance is similar to metaphoricity: both posit a 
complex interweaving of presence and absence to produce signification. A 
crucial argument Derrida advances is that this play of signification is only ever 
brought to an end for contingent reasons. Though all discourse is constituted by 
this logic of differentiality and deferral, not all discourse will or can acknowledge 
this, and historically certain discourses have attempted to halt or obscure the 
play of signification by employing various distinctive strategies. In Western 
culture, the invocation of a so-called 'transcendental signified' has tended to be 
the mode of legitimation favoured by logocentric philosophy. Sarup cites Idea, 
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Matter, World Spirit, and God as examples of such signifieds. Each of these 'acts 
as the foundation of a system of thought and forms an axis around which all 
other signs circulate' (Sarup 1988: 37). 
The dissemination of meaning is found in philosophical texts as well as literary 
ones. Norris writes as follows: 'Derrida has no desire to establish a rigid 
demarcation of zones between literary language and critical discourse. On the 
contrary, he sets out to show that certain kinds of paradox are produced across 
all the varieties of discourse by a motivating impulse which runs so deep in 
Western thought that it respects none of the conventional boundaries' (Norris 
1982: 21). This position is clearly one root of the generalized textual relativism 
propagated in introductory texts such as Sarup's. The paradox Norris refers to is 
generated by the tension between statement and structure, between what I 
would want to say and what I am constrained by the communicative structure at 
my disposal to say. Thus Plato warns against the evils of writing but can do so 
only by writing himself. This tension is also what gives deconstruction its 
'method': 'It seeks to undo both a given order of priorities and the very system of 
conceptual opposition that makes that order possible' (Norris 1982: 31). Its 
concentration on a 'given order of priorities' makes it undesirable, however, to 
present deconstruction as a general method separate from its engagement with 
particular texts: 'Deconstruction is therefore an activity of reading which remains 
closely tied to the texts it interrogates, and which can never set up independently 
as a self-enclosed system of operative concepts: (Norris 1982: 31). It is also not 
synonymous with destruction. Barbara Johnson usefully describes it as being 'the 
careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text itself (Johnson 
1980: 9). 
Clearly such an account implies a re-assessment of the relationship between 
philosophy and literature. If the same logic of deferral of meaning underlies both, 
then it becomes difficult to think how philosophy can maintain itself, except as the 
continued deconstruction of its own tradition. Philosophy as anti-philosophy. 
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Literature becomes especially valued in this account as the mode of textuality 
which acknowledges and celebrates the fact that it is first and foremost play. In 
some way, if this argument is pursued, literature comes across as being more 
honest, at least more sensible, than philosophy, which has pursued a dream of 
presence and its own transcendental legitimization across centuries, too often 
misrecognizing the metaphoricity that grounds it. However, it would be a mistake 
to argue that Derrida elevates the literary above the philosophical. Instead, I 
believe he presents us with the possibility of what we might call playful 
philosophy. Such a practice would be legitimately distinguishable from literature, 
since conceptual thinking would remain its basic activity, but it would cease 
attempting to centre itself by means of a transcendental presence. It would be 
playful because it would always be provisional. This does not mean that it would 
not be 'serious', but rather that oppositions such as that between the serious and 
the frivolous are eminently deconstructible . 
. If Derrida does not consider philosophy to be merely a form of metaphoricity 
which has forgotten itself, this has not prevented the broader reception of his 
work to assert just this. In fact, Derrida has been exceptionally prone to 
oversimplification by both hostile and sympathetic commentators. One reason for 
this is his inclusion in the ranks of a general post-structuralism. While apposite, 
this has also meant that the truisms of this orientation have been assigned in an 
uncritical way to his work. In the next chapter I wish to develop my critique of the 
post-structuralist tendency to assert a general ascendancy of the poetic mode, as 
the mode where the referential dimension is subordinated to the tropic 
dimension, by looking at a number of perspectives which, without being crudely 




REFERENCE, USE AND WITTGENSTEIN 
In the last two chapters we have looked at the inversion of the opposition 
between poetry and philosophy due to changing conceptions of truth and 
language. When it is argued that the project of philosophy is a misrecognition of 
what is possible within language, there would seem to be an inevitable re-
appraisal of modes which frankly use language creatively and do not rely on 
transcendental assumptions for their main effect. Thus we have seen a number 
of thinkers in recent times who would be sympathetic to Nietzsche when he 
writes: 'What I had to say then - too bad that I did not dare say it as a poet' 
(Kofman 1993: p5)'. Eagleton, in his Literary Theory: An Introduction expresses it 
as follows: 'Literary works ... are in a sense less deluded than other forms of 
discourse, because they implicitly acknowledge their own rhetorical status - the 
fact that what they say is different from what they do, that all their claims to 
knowledge work through figurative structures which render them ambiguous and 
indeterminate' (Eagleton 1983: 145). If language is always metaphorical, always 
traversed by difference, then it makes sense that we would see in poetry a more 
powerful or more primary activity than philosophy. From this perspective, 
philosophy seems only a recurrent, empty gesture of turning away from 
figuration. 
However, such a picture is an oversimplification. This chapter, whilst recognizing 
the validity of the Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean insight into metaphoricity, 
asserts that there are nevertheless differences between poetry and philosophy 
worth retaining and defending as clearly as possible. We lose far more than we 
gain by arguing, as in the simplistic versions of post-structuralism, that the 
concept is solely a metaphor which has forgotten its origins, that language is 
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solely a differential system which doesn't link up with the world in significant 
ways. I will firstly discuss some reasons why we cannot abandon the notion of 
referentiality entirely, and then move on to the notion of use as developed by 
Wittgenstein, which recontextualizes many of the questions we have looked at. 
Within the framework established by Saussure, the pivotal question is where and 
how, if at all, signifier and signified, which together form the sign, refer outside 
themselves to a 'world'. Can it be asserted that the meaning of a sign is 
exclusively a result of its place in a system? If we assent to this, and many post-
structuralists would seem to, then the way is open to understanding literature as 
an enclosed intertextual system which makes no serious claims concerning the 
world and which can therefore not engage with the values of the world. A text, 
according to this reading, refers to nothing but other texts. From this it would 
follow that philosophy, as a form of textual communication, can only exist as the 
critique of its own textual tradition, a view which all too easily culminates in the 
idea that the project of deconstruction inaugurates the end of philosophy by 
opening a space where 'poetry' and 'philosophy' come to mean the same thing, 
or, if you will, not much at all. Clearly a great deal depends on this question, and 
yet it seems as though post-structuralists have rarely attempted to think through 
the issue of referentiality in an analytical way. 
For Saussure, it is the role the sign plays in a system that gives it meaning. 
In his essay 'Sense, reference and logic' Christopher Norris cites Saussure's 
example of the 8:25 p.m. Geneva-to-Paris Express: 'There is a sense in which 
this is the same train every day, despite the fact that engine, coaches and driver 
may be subject to endless daily substitutions ..... The 8:25 is not so much a 
referent - an object picked out by straightforward designative naming - as a term 
within that larger, differential context' (Norris1985: 62). It would be misleading to 
insist that the 8:25 train is a particular coach and engine, and in a similar way 
reference should not be regarded as the primary determinant of meaning. We 
may say, borrowing our terminology from Gottlob Frege, who is in fact the main 
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focus of Norris's essay, that sense precedes reference. As Norris puts it: 'our use 
of language to designate objects always depends on our possessing a set of 
definitional criteria by which to pick those objects out. Language, that is to say, is 
established as a referential medium only in so far as we can specify what counts 
as an achieved or felicitous act of reference' (Norris 1985: 50). Before I can 
identify a 'cat' as a 'cat', I need ·to possess the sense of 'cat', and this happens 
within a language system. No degree of empirical, 'language-less' acquaintance 
with the actual animal will bestow on it a meaning which can take its place in a 
language system. Another way of saying this would be that the world is not 
conveniently sliced up into inherently meaningful pieces, but that we assign this 
meaning from within a system. Consequently, if reference is not the primary 
determinant of meaning, then simple realist accounts of the way language and 
world connect must be inadequate. 
Frege's notion of reference, though similar, is not identical to Saussure's. 
Saussure does not deny the referentiality of language, but he does want to put 
linguistics on a new footing by studying what he believes can profitably be 
studied: language as a system preceding specific articulations. Norris is aware 
that this orientation can erroneously be assumed to be a denial of referentiality: 
'It is in the interests of linguistics as a systematic study that Saussure 
brackets ... the referential dimension and concentrates on the 'arbitrary' relation 
between signifier and signified. The problem with much post-structuralist thinking 
is that it takes this methodological convenience for a high point of philosophic 
principle' (Norris 1985: 62). In seeking a corrective to this post~structuralist 
tendency, Norris turns to Frege, whose account of language does feature 
reference. However, Frege is in agreement with Saussure that 'language 
constitutes a structure of signifying relationships which always interpose between 
word and object, semantic sense and empirical reference' (Norris 1985: 59, 60). 
Frege famously employs the example of the 'Morning Star' and the 'Evening Star' 
(the planet Venus) to sho"'' that sense is not governed by reference. In this case 
the referent is the same in both cases, and yet it gives rise to two different 
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senses, such that someone could easily assume two separate phenomena were 
under discussion. There is of course only one, but we require two different ways 
of talking about it: two senses, in other words. However, though it is clear that 
meaning can never be a matter of simple referentiality, this example also shows 
the complexity of the question. Norris cites the one referent I two senses 
example to indicate the primacy of sense, but one could argue that there would 
surely be no need to have two senses if it weren't for the fact that the same 
planet appears at different times depending on the season. And the fact that the 
planet appears at different times is clearly an empirical fact, that is to say, a 
matter of reference. In other words, doesn't our example demonstrate that sense 
is constrained by what it refers to? After all, we don't habitually go around 
assigning two different names to every entity in the sky. If we do so here it is 
ultimately for empirical reasons, reasons which question any simple primacy of 
sense. Though sense bestows meaning, that meaning is constrained by the 
empirical reality to which it is held to refer. 
Tallis argues that the sense of an object cannot be a matter of its physicality: 
'senses are not the physical properties of the objects; nor do they 
necessarily correlate clearly with those objects; for while physical 
properties place limits upon plausible senses (for example feasible uses), 
they do not fix those senses completely. The sense ... will...be highly 
variable ... It will depend upon the interests, moods, physiological states 
and personal history of the individual taking notice of it, as well as, more 
remotely, upon the history of the society in which he lives' 
(Tallis 1995: 111). 
However, there is still an extra-linguistic rock bottom which constrains the 
parameters of sense. The constraints which govern the possible senses of a term 
may be very loose, and often are, but they do exist. In a given communicative 
situation, it is more likely that a brick would be accorded the sense of weapon 
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than a balloon, because of its physical properties and the way those properties 
are able to interact with the larger physical universe: ' the variability of the 
application of words to objects ... and the freedom we have to reclassify objects 
under different categories do not license the assumption that there is a total 
arbitrariness in the relations between words and things:' (Tallis 1995: 109). 
To complement Saussure's notion of structure, we need to think of the 
communicative context, where the possible senses of an object are materialized 
in the sign. Though an object has an indefinite number of senses, not all of these 
can or will come into play in a particular context. Rather, the sense that comes to 
dominate is a function of what the participants are trying to use language for. 
This is not to say that words conveniently carry their meanings with them. 
However, if we assume that understanding is possible (if, in other words, we are 
not total sceptics) then communication must be seen as negotiation which 
produces meaning. The infinitely extended system of language is finitized in a 
given situation. This does not imply that communication is always smooth, that 
participants are always wholly present to each other. But what is 
misunderstanding if not a situation where participants have erroneously assumed 
agreement over the sense of a sign or a series of signs? And what can be done 
but negotiate a common sense, or at least one with overlapping edges? Eagleton 
seems to agree that the systemic study of language has to be supplemented with 
an understanding of use, where meaning becomes strategic and negotiated 
because it is based on the aims of participants: 'Meaning may well be ultimately 
undecidable if we view language contemplatively, as a chain of signifiers on a 
page; it becomes 'decidable' ... when we think of language rather as something we · 
do, as indissociably interwoven with our practical forms of life' (Eagleton 1983: 
147). 
The above discussion should caution us against assuming too quickly that the 
recognition of metaphoricity can or should lead to the deconstruction of the 
poetry - philosophy opposition in favour of a generalized sense of textual effect. 
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For if a degree of referentiality underlies our use of language, then we need to 
locate the problematic of metaphoricity and conceptuality within a general 
framework of use. If neither metaphor nor reference is absolute, it becomes 
necessary to look at their possible functions in discourse. I have pursued this 
course because I believe a danger resides in arguing for the pervasiveness of 
metaphor if this argument is pushed too far, in other words pushed towards a 
textual idealism which recognizes no dialectic between world and text. Since the 
articulation of such a model is a philosophical undertaking, an 'alternative' also 
has to begin from philosophical considerations. Clearly we cannot, and would not 
wish to, return to naive realism, which would be disastrous for literature, as well 
as philosophically erroneous. However, I believe that turning to a notion of use 
derived from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is one feasible way of 
reinstating a working distinction between poetry and philosophy. 
!! 
Wittgenstein introduces the notion of a language game to counter the dominant 
view that language is a uniform entity capable of being defined univocally. The 
Philosophical Investigations opens with a quotation from the Confessions of 
Augustine which depicts the learning of language as a process of ostensive 
definition: a thing is matched to its name, and they correspond in such a way that 
to inquire after the meaning of a word is to ask after the object it refers to. 
Wittgenstein's criticism of this view is two-fold. Firstly, this account holds true, if 
at all, only for nouns like 'table' and 'chair': for material 'things' in other words. 
According to Wittgenstein, Augustine 'does not speak of there being any 
difference between kinds of word' (Wittgenstein 1958: §1). He is thinking only 
secondarily of actions and properties, and of the remaining kinds of words as 
'something that will take care of itself (Wittgenstein 1958: §1). Augustine's 
account of language, a proto-realist one, is not so much wrong as oversimplified: 
to the extent that it purports to explain language, it does not do justice to the 
complexity of what is being examined: 'Augustine ... does describe a system of 
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communication; only not everything that we call language is this system' 
(Wittgenstein 1958: §3). In isolating one way of thinking about language and 
trying to posit it as the essential way language is learned and used, Augustine 
demonstrates that drive towards oversimplification which, for Wittgenstein, is 
characteristic of most philosophy in its quest for generally valid, essential 
propositions: 'It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language 
and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, 
with what logicians have said about the structure of language' (Wittgenstein 
1958: §12). 
However, Wittgenstein's problematization of philosophy's tendency to 
oversimplify does not lead him to turn to the elevation of figurative uses of 
language as a better option. He would see in such a turn an equally problematic 
manoeuvre, since it too would tend to posit one essential aspect of language, its 
metaphoricity in this case. The notion of language-games is introduced to 
counter our tendency to think that understanding something must involve 
intellectually grasping its essence. We are tempted, for example, to ask the 
question: what is common to all games? We say: 'There must be something 
common, or they would not be called 'games" (Wittgenstein 1958: §66). To this 
Wittgenstein replies: 'but look and see whether there is anything common to all' 
(Wittgenstein 1958: §66). Elsewhere he gives the example of looking into the 
cabin of a locomotive: all the handles will look the same, and this is to be 
expected, since 'they are all supposed to be handled' (Wittgenstein 1958: §120). 
But the fact that all words exist to be used, does not mean that all words are 
used or made to be used in the same way. Where philosophers have tended to 
see identity, Wittgenstein, instead, tends to see 'a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of detail' (Wittgenstein 1958: §66). Wittgenstein argues 
that if we were called on to describe 'games' to someone, we would describe 
particular games, adding, perhaps, that 'This and similar things are called 
'games" (Wittgenstein 1958: §69). In other words, we would not move straight to 
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the plane of abstraction by listing properties supposedly common to all games, 
but would do no more than hint at possible abstraction, through the description of 
a variety of actual games. It is precisely the jump to the abstract plane, to 
'thinking' instead of 'looking', which we call philosophy, and which Wittgenstein 
warns us against. 
The critique of philosophy that Wittgenstein presents derives, in his later work, 
from the revaluation of ordinary language and practices grounded in it. 
Wittgenstein holds that the level of rationality of ordinary language is sufficient: it 
is misguided to think that 'our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite 
unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us' 
(Wittgenstein 1958: §98). When we think like this we are blinded by the 
possibility of the ideal; we are creating pseudo-requirements for language. We do 
this by removing language from the original language-games which are their 
home and where we originally learned them. For Wittgenstein, the problems of 
philosophy as traditionally conceived arise through the spurious redeployment of 
terms which belong in ordi!'lary language, where their use is circumscribed by 
practices, into the philosophical sphere: 'When philosophers use a word -
'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition', 'name' - and try to grasp the 
essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually 
used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?' (Wittgenstein 
1958: §116). The positing of a uniquely philosophical discourse 
'misunderstand[s] the role of the ideal in our language' (Wittgenstein 1958: 
§100). Here again, though from a different perspective, we find the argument that 
philosophy is a kind of language use which has forgotten the origins of what it 
uses. It is his recognition of the value of practical modes of rationality and 
knowledge within ordinary language which leads Wittgenstein to describe 
philosophy as the 'bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language' 
(Wittgenstein 1958: §109). The fact that Wittgenstein is himself a philosopher, 
engaged in philosophy, in :io way contradicts his argument. For Wittgenstein 
explicitly conceives of his philosophizing as a therapy. Philosophy is both the 
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disease and the only quarter from which a true cure could be effected. By 
bringing words 'back from their metaphysical to their everyday use' (Wittgenstein 
1958: §116), by uncovering the non-sense at the limits of the way language can 
be used, we can reconceive our practices in a radical way. 
What are the implications for the way we think about poetry and philosophy? I 
believe this way of conceiving philosophy has interesting consequences for at 
least three aspects of what I've been discussing thus far. Firstly, Wittgenstein 
adds his voice to the growing consensus that it is misconceived to regard 
philosophy's mode of rationality as the appropriate measure for literature. His 
emphasis on the concrete and on context is an antidote to any nascent scientism 
we might harbour. Though a nuts-and-bolts pragmatism has, I believe, 
characterized concrete investigation in all the sciences, not exempting the natural 
sciences (as Paul Feyerabend, for example, has shown in Against Method) this 
pragmatism often co-exists uneasily with a tendency to retrospectively posit a 
method based on strict empirical verifiability and methodological consistency. 
There is a vast, and worrying, difference between the kind of thinking and 
method a working scientist employs, and the account of that process in the 
average science textbook, with its assumption of cumulative, linear development. 
In a related fashion, though on a more modest scale, the human sciences, and 
literary theory, are periodically beset by insecurity concerning the apparent lack 
of a sure base to their practices. Wittgenstein, however, would like us to make 
peace with pragmatism, even when we are attempting to define the foundations 
of our practices. He asks: 'What does it mean to know what a game is?' 
(Wittgenstein 1958: §75) and dismisses the notion that this knowledge is 
equivalent to an unformulated definition which we need to find. In a passage 
which points to a conception of method particularly relevant to the human 
sciences, Wittgenstein lists modes of explanation we might avail ourselves of in a 
concrete situation, such as 'describing examples of various kinds of game; 
showing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of 
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these; saying that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and so on' 
(Wittgenstein 1958: §75). 
It follows from this that the boundaries we invoke between, for example, 'game' 
and 'not-game', or 'literature' and 'non-literature', are more fluid than we 
sometimes allow. Wittgenstein uses the notion of a 'concept with blurred edges' 
(Wittgenstein 1958: §71) and argues that this is quite often exactly what we 
need. If literature is an instance of a 'blurred concept', this does not mean that it 
is a useless concept, but one which is used and learned in a variety of contexts 
and which will display a variety of uses and thus of meanings, resembling each 
other in much the same way as members of an extended family do. Wittgenstein 
would thus agree that there can be no strict, non-contingent way to distinguish 
poetry from philosophy, no final way, in other words, and that in this sense the 
tradition originating with Plato is ill-conceived. For this tradition thinks that it can 
posit essences derived from knowledge of formal properties and use this as a 
basis for discrimination. But the positing of an essence is already a philosophical 
strategy, dependent on context, and thus not an a priori ground. Those who 
would wish to regulate practices by means of stricter methodological rules forget 
that such rules would themselves have to be applied in a concrete instance 
where the ambiguities and indeterminacies of practice, and the primacy of 
context, would necessarily prevail. Poetry and philosophy, then, would tend to 
overlap at the edges of use. Historically there have been philosophical poems, as 
well as poetic philosophers, Plato pre-eminent among them, and of course a 
whole array of works whose nature is still a source of contention. Wittgenstein is 
clearly in sympathy with a general current which has sought to defend thinking 
without recourse to absolute truth: arguing for a language-practice bind which 
avoids the problem of thinking about the 'essences' of things whilst retaining a 
conception of 'adequate' rationality. This does not mean that poetry and 
philosophy are interchangeable terms, or that one is a misguided form of the 
other, or reducible to the other. Historically, their uses have varied. Not only has 
poetry been used differently from philosophy, but each has shown a varied 
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internal history too. What philosophy and poetry meant for the Greeks cannot be 
identical to what industrialized Western culture now uses them for. 
Wittgenstein's thought also re-situates the whole notion of referentiality and its 
significance for philosophical inquiry. In his essay 'Wittgenstein and the Social 
and Historical Functions of Literature' David Schalkwyk argues that for both 
Wittgenstein and Saussure 'reference is not and cannot be the paradigm of all 
language'. But where Saussure brackets referentiality in favour of the sense-
bestowing agency of the system, for Wittgenstein reference is a use of language, 
neither privileged nor nonsensical. In Schalkwyk's words: 'It is use, within social 
practices, that determines meaning; meaning does not determine use' 
(Schalkwyk 1990: 73). It follows from this that 'Reference remains as a particular 
use of language, but with no particularly privileged status, a way of drawing 
reality into language, making it a part of 'grammar', rather than an illusion which 
needs to be unmasked' (Schalkwyk 1990: 70, 71 ). This is an appeal for a shift in 
our thinking, where, instead of abstracting further when we try to assign meaning, 
we instead look at the context wherein a phenomenon ordinarily functions. It is 
the context which supplies us with adequate rationality, because it supplies us 
with the parameters of feasible use. 
When we concentrate on use, the first thing that must strike us is the irreducible 
complexity of phenomena. In recognizing this, Wittgenstein's work converges 
with a key post-structuralist notion. Where traditionally philosophy unifies by 
simplifying, by assigning identity where there is similarity, deriving meaning from 
use would entail sensitivity to the meaning-bestowing effect of a given context. 
This also means that to assert that philosophy is a form of metaphorical thinking 
and therefore does what literature does, without being aware of it, is to be blind 
to the context of use philosophy opens up for itself, a context different from the 
context of use in which poetry functions. It is no longer a case of the Platonic 
question about the securing of the true and the mode most appropriate to that, 
but instead a recognition that we may wish to distinguish between spheres of use 
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and that the terms 'poetry' and 'philosophy' are useful in this regard. Though 
there is no essential way to define either literature or philosophy, this cannot lead 
to the conclusion that poetry and philosophy are interchangeable terms, or that 
one is reducible to the other: what we have are complex practices marked as 
much by discontinuities as continuities. Schalkwyk writes in this regard that 
'literature does not carry its own 'literariness' on its face. Such 'literariness' is a 
product of collective human uses, under the changing pressures of particular 
forms of life' (Schalkwyk 1990: 75). 
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CONCLUSION 
THE USE OF PHILOSOPHY 
We have seen that the status of philosophy can never be secured by an appeal 
to its being essentially different from other forms of discourse, though of course 
an attempted transcendental grounding has, historically, been the distinctive 
philosophical move. Many theorists consequently argue that philosophy's 
attempted claims to autonomy are little more than delusional. In the preceding 
chapter I gave some indication of how a notion of use could make us sensitive to 
differences between poetry and philosophy as they function within the changing 
contexts that legitimate them. So conceived, philosophy is one way of framing 
language, a way which, moreover, has a historical origin and could presumably 
disappear given appropriate circumstances. To argue like this is to argue that 
philosophy is a discourse, or, if you will, a language-game, with an internal set of 
rules but no particularly privileged status. This does not, however, mean that we 
cannot ask after the nature of this language-game, or ask whether its insights 
cannot be useful to the way we understand literature and literary theory. 
If a language-game is rooted in practice, then any given language-game is 
subject to change, since practices clearly do not stay the same: 'new types of 
language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and 
others become obsolete and get forgotten' (Wittgenstein 1958: §23). Though this 
way of thinking yields a useful, dynamic model of literary practice, it is also quite 
vague. In developing these ideas, Schalkwyk argues that Wittgenstein is relevant 
to literary theory because 'his work alerts us to the social uses of literature as 
communal practice, it leads us to reconsider the relationship between our 
habitual critical language-games and the forms of life from which they spring and 
which they in turn help to maintain, and it provides an important philosophical 
basis for an historical critical practice' (Schalkwyk 1990: 68). For Schalkwyk the 
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emphasis on practice necessarily de-centers the subject and shows that all 
understanding is indissolubly social: 'Although language can be used only within 
language-games, they are not structures which determine in advance all the 
possible significations of a word. It is use, within social practices, that determines 
meaning' (Schalkwyk 1990: 73). Wittgenstein is to be praised, according to 
Schalkwyk, because he allows us to view 'literariness' not as a fixed category, 
but as a 'product of collective human uses, under the changing pressures of 
particular forms of life' (Schalkwyk 1990: 75). Clearly the pressures of particular 
forms of life would include the pressures of history and sectarian discourses 
within the social. Schalkwyk further contends that language-games, such as that 
of literary criticism, change 'when the forms of life upon which they are based are 
shifted because of different, clashing needs and interests. A corollary to this is 
that a language-game may be used to perform a variety of social functions. So 
the language-game that one group may want to promote as the appropriate one 
for literary criticism may also endorse particular forms of political, cultural or 
economic life' (Schalkwyk 1990: 76). A language-game is more a site of struggle 
than a point of view. What we mean by poetry is a function of the language-game 
in which we ask such a question; and within that language-game there are a 
multiplicity of available answers. The difference between such an account and 
the combinatory possibilities of a system as structuralism understands it, is that 
in this account it is impossible to isolate the structure from the practice. The 
structuralist move is a possible one within the language-game of theory, but it 
accords the notion of structure an independence which involves artificially 
distinguishing it from its applications. 
The main problem with this account is whether Wittgenstein's way of thinking can 
ever account for the possibility of meaningful critical engagement with practices, 
engagement which changes those practices in a radical way. If we endorse 
Wittgenstein's account because it allows us to think socially about literature, does 
this automatically mean that he also enables us to think critically about it? 
Wittgenstein tends to avoid dealing with the mechanisms which make language-
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games change: what forces would be involved, whether it is meaningful to ask if 
a language-game has changed for the better, and so on. Though he gives us a 
way of thinking about language which avoids the problems of referentiality and 
solipsism, he does not explicate the role of history, least of all the possibility of a 
critical relation to history. In David Bloor's Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of 
Knowledge, we find the following 'There is no meaning without language-games; 
and no language-games without forms of life. Wittgenstein's discussion of 
training made it clear that a culture cannot be sustained unless we have the 
power to control behaviour while we are transmitting information' (cited in 
Schalkwyk 1990: 74). The allusion to the 'power to control behaviour' clearly 
prompts the question of whether language-games are so inextricably interwoven 
with their own modes of legitimation that to ask after the possibility of radical 
criticism mistakes causes and effects. Is thinking no more than apologetics when 
it denies the possibility of a form of conceptual thought (ultimately Hegelian) 
which could present itself as the dialectic negative of a given language game? 
How to account, from within this model, for emancipatory orientations such as 
Feminism and Marxism? 
In a chapter of One-Dimensional Man called 'The Triumph of Positive Thinking: 
One-Dimensional Philosophy', Herbert Marcuse contends that ordinary language 
philosophers enshrine the language that they find, and refuse to deal with the 
issue of history as the site of struggle, and therefore with the possibility of forces 
which modify and distort language. According to Marcuse, the language which 
the 'chap on the street' speaks is a 'purged language, purged not only of its 
'unorthodox' vocabulary, but also of the means for expressing any other contents 
than those furnished to the individuals by their society' (Marcuse 1986: 174). 
Wittgenstein does indeed at times seem to want to limit the possible function of 
philosophy: 'Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; 
it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It 
leaves everything as it is' (Wittgenstein 1958: §124). For Marcuse, this is a 
reactionary approach because it assents to whatever is; philosophy only 
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describes a language game, it does not aim to change it by revealing other 
possibilities or uncovering the distortions of power. This is an invalid 
understanding of philosophy, which has always been, and been understood as, 
intervention rather than therapy: 'The philosopher is not a physician; his job is not 
to cure individuals but to comprehend the world in which they live - to 
understand it in terms of what it has done to man, and what it can do to man' 
(Marcuse 1986: 183). For Marcuse philosophy is only defendable as the critique 
of the given. It is because the given is problematic that philosophy remains 
important, not as epistemology or linguistics, but as the questioning of this given: 
'The historical dissolution and even subversion of the given facts is the historical 
task of philosophy and the philosophic dimension' (Marcuse 1986: 185). 
Marcuse articulates a transformational perspective which has become less 
tenable in recent times, because it purports to explain or ground other language-
games, rather than acknowledge that it too is just one more such game. If the 
relationship between poetry and philosophy has always been complex and 
dynamic, it is made more so by this questioning of philosophy's right to 
adjudicate between practices and ways of life and to lay down guidelines for their 
transformation. Does literature then need philosophy at all? Why not have done 
with it and simply call it a deluded discourse? To the extent that literature must 
deal with issues such as those of internal ideological distortion and power, a 
critical philosophy can provide the necessary conceptual tools and dialectical 
awareness. Though they are both language-games, philosophy's essential 
commitment to self-reflexivity rescues it from redundancy in the literary realm. A 
'commitment to self-reflexivity', however, also entails a complex re-reading of the 
literature - philosophy opposition itself, one which could very easily follow 
Derrida and deconstruct it in favour of a more generalized textuality. Whether 
such a reconceived configuration would remain sensitive to the problems of 
power is an instance of the more general philosophical question concerning 
deconstruction's ethical and political viability. Though it remains difficult to assess 
the extent to which literature needs philosophy, it may be safer to point out that 
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philosophy needs literature, because literature, as a representational mode which 
is both serious and playful, shows that utterances can possess value even if they 
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